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"Toward a Theology of the History of Religions" submitted by LAM Tsz Shun, 
Jason for the degree of Master of Divinity at the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong in May 2000. 
This thesis tries to outline the development of the German theologian Wolfhart 
Pannenberg's thought system based on a chronological reading from Revelation as 
History to Systematic Theology VoLl, publications related to theology of history of 
religions. Besides articulating the causes, influences, inner logic, limitations and 
difficulties of every stage and between stages of his thought, the emphasis is placed 
on the point that the theological system is established on his understanding of a 
history of religions. It is because to Pannenberg God's revelation is not manifested in 
or through history, but as history; and this history is a universal one formed by the 
encounter of historic religions. The thesis also points out that Pannenberg's 
theological system is not based on a fideistic revelationist position, on the contrary it 
has demonstrated its testability and coherency. However as it is not constructed by 
conducting serious investigation on concrete religions, plus its presupposed dogmatic 
point of view, the system discourages doing inter-religious dialogue in the 
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Stanley J. Grenz introduces Wolfhart Pannenberg's Systematische Theologie as 
follows: 
In his systematic theology Pannenberg carries out the program indicated in 
his methodological writings. He is seeking to provide a new direction in 
theological understanding in order to combat what he perceives to be a 
widespread privatization of religious belief in general and of theology in 
particular. For Pannenberg, in contrast, theology is a public discipline� 
A public discipline — to Pannenberg, at least refers to a university subject which can 
be studied as other scientific disciplines; the context which theology collects its data 
and the place where theology is put to test is the world publicly assessible. But 
Pannenberg knows very well that our contemporary public realm is constituted by a 
plurality of religions, and by religions he does not mean some abstract concepts but 
the historic religions in which human beings are continuously involved in history. 
Thus one of Pannenberg's most important tasks is to promote the truth of Christianity 
as universal under this circumstance. This is the reason why he has devoted the first 
250 pages of his 450-page Systematic Theology Vol.1 as a prolegomena for his 
theology per se. At the heart of this foundational work is the model of the history of 
religions Pannenberg carefully developed. Therefore it is justified to say that 
Pannenberg intended to create a theology grounded on the history of religions, and 
whether his enterprise stands or falls also relies largely on the success of this model. 
In this sense, w hat we are going lo investigate is not merely one of the many issues of 
this German theological giant, but to inspect the viability of his program as a whole. 
It is well known thai ihe name Wolfhart Pannenberg entered the stage of 
conlemporan- theological circle with the publication Offenharung cils Geschichte 
(English translation as Rerelaiion as IIis!ory)~ As the title of the book suggests, this 
I Stanley J. Grenz, Reason for Hope (NY: OL.I). 1990). p.8. 
:jVohliart Pannenberg. Rolf RendtortT. Trutz RendtorlT. Ulrich Wilckens. Offenharung ah Geschichte 
(Gottmgen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1961. 1963): English translation is available as Revelation as 
Hi如 'y’ David Granskou trans. (London: Macmillan. 1969). hereafter abbreviated as RaH. 
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symposium takes revelation as the theme of the discussion. In the first half of 20山 
century, Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann are often viewed as the two opposite ends of 
the theological spectrum on this issue. In the early years of Barth, revelation was 
posited in a sphere called Urgeschichte (pre-history), while Bultmann placed 
revelation in the historicity {Geschichtlichkeit) of the individual. Although they seem 
to stand on different extremities, Pannenberg thinks that their interpretations are both 
haunted by the same problematic. He says: 
Their common starting point is to be seen in the fact that critical-historical 
investigation as the scientific verification of events did not seem to leave 
any more room for redemptive events. Therefore the theology of 
redemptive history fled into a harbour supposedly safe from the critical-
historical flood tide, the harbour of a suprahistory - or with Barth, of pre-
history. For the same reason the theology of existence withdrew from the 
meaningless and godless course of "objective" history to the experience of 
the significance of history in the "historicity" of the individual.^ 
It is obvious that his first objective is to reclaim the connection between revelation 
and history - revelation is as history but not merely in or through history - as a 
criticism to his predecessors. 
Pannenberg began his theological enterprise concerning the issue of revelation 
and history, and raised his criticism against two German Christian theologians. But he 
reaches a mature stage concerning for establishing a “public” discipline, though it is 
also related to the same theme, the scenario is enlarged to the history of the plurality 
of religions but not only within the Christian religion. This essay will then look into 
the important writings of this interesting development according to the chronological 
order. In due course we shall find out Pannenberg's initiative and methodology to 
build up such a program, and as well as the goal, i.e. the universal truth he finds in 
Christianity in his model of the history of religions. But a more important objective 
of this essay is to examine the feasibility of this program, and to see how it may 
contribute to the current theological discussion under the circ画stance of religious 
pluralism. We shall find that Pannenberg has really created a sophisticated and 
coherent theological system, which can also satisfy the scientific requirement of 
testability. However we shall also discover the presuppositions, limitations and 
and History”，B霞 Q細瞧.ZW鄉 Vol. 1, George H 
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problems of Pannenberg's system - paradoxical is that though Pannenberg himself 
encourages the study of historic religions, within his system a lack of genuine 
encounter with historic religions is detected. The result is that he has anticipated a 
history of religions from his own unalterable presupposition, and unfortunately a 
program unfavourable for inter-religious dialogue is formed. 
We have briefly described the German theological situation when Pannenberg 
began his enterprise. In the next chapter we shall deal in depth a little and see 
Pannenberg's immediate response with 7 dogmatic theses contained in Offenbarung 
a/s Geschichte. With a preliminary analysis we shall find that there are several issues 
Pannenberg has to follow if he wants to develop this proposal. Chapter 3 will deal 
with two very technical problems, concerning Pannenberg's historical and 
hermeneutical methods. They are also central to his entire theological enterprise. Up 
to this point it seems that still we have not touched on the concern of this essay, i.e. on 
constructing a theology of the history of religions. In chapter 4 we shall deal with that. 
We shall see why and how Pannenberg would come across the problem - it is a 
natural and necessary development of his theological program. More than 10 years 
after Offenbarung als Geschichte was published, Pannenberg began to outline his 
theological framework through a dialogue with the philosophy of science. In chapter 
5 we shall see how he gave a preliminary sketch of the program and how it is related 
to the history of religions. Of course, lastly Pannenberg executed it in his magnum 
opus _ Systematische Theologie. We shall on the one hand see the talent of the 
systematic theologian to build up his Gestalt and on the other hand make an appraisal 
in Chapter 6. Finally we shall end with a chapter discussing the lesson we can learn 
from this theological giant in constructing a theology of history of religions. 
J 
Chapter 2 
Agenda Illustrated as in Revelation as History 
In 1961 a book titled Ojfenbarung als Geschichte was published by a group of 
young theologians in Germany. Since 1951 this group and others who were doctoral 
students at Heidelberg have been meeting regularly to formulate the basic idea of this 
publication, which focuses on the problem of revelation and history from biblical, 
historical and systematic perspectives. This volume can be regarded as a result of 
their discussion. The leader and the chief spokesman of this so-called Heidelberg 
circle is Wolfhart Pannenberg, who wrote his part from the view of a systematic 
theology as well as the introduction of the book, and the group is thus also known as 
the Pannenberg circle. As trained as a systematic theologian, he was responsible for 
providing the over-all synthesis for others' historical and exegetical works. Besides 
Pannenberg (who was then the professor of systematic theology at Mainz), other 
major participants of this publication are Rolf Rendtorff for Old Testament (who was 
then the professor of Old Testament at Heidelberg), Ulrich Wilckens for New 
Testament (who was then professor of New Testament at the Kirchliche Hochschule in 
Berlin), and Trutz Rendtorff for church history. However the circle does not only 
involve these few, others who are associated include also Dieter Rossler, the pastor 
and Privadozent of practical theology at Gottingen, Martin Elze, lecturer in church 
history at Tubingen, and Klaus Koch, professor of Old Testament at Hamburg. From 
this list we can see that all of the participants have been occupying the positions of the 
important schools in Germany. Therefore no matter their program is sound or not, 
this circle has really created "a new theological movement," in the country. 
''"Niw/ /-S^^ 
1 A wording used by Daniel P. Fuller; see: "A New German Theological Movement", Scottish Journal 
of Theology 19(1966): 160-175. 
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The Problem Perceived by Pannenberg 
From the very beginning of the book, Pannenberg characterizes the 
contemporary issue of protestant theology as "a pure theology of revelation"? He 
conceives it as an influence of the theology of Karl Barth, who confined the definition 
of revelation as "the self-revelation of God", and a consensus of theological 
discussion was established on it. It is the beginning of the problem. 
In Pannenberg's view, to emphasize revelation as the strict sense of self-
revelation is in fact to stress on the uniqueness of revelation, which is a legacy of 
German idealism. Under the influence of Hegel, who introduced the idea of the 
absolute as Spirit, the full self-manifestation of God can only be a unique one. In 
addition, the idea so strictly formulated no longer lets any medium apart from God 
himself be the medium of revelation. Therefore if Jesus Christ as a true man is 
regarded as a creaturely medium of self-revelation of God, he must be presupposed to 
have a unity with God in essence."^ This is the root of the christological statement 
about the divinity of Jesus Christ in Earth's Church Dogmatics, thinks Pannenberg, 
which is also a kind of unity-in-revelation. ^  
Because of this strong emphasis of the uniqueness of direct self-revelation, 
Barth rejected any kind of natural revelation. Since if the revelation in the Christ 
event is so decisive, any form of revelation in other events, situations and persons will 
violate the thought of self-revelation in the strictest sense. Because a multiplicity of 
revelation will discredit any particular revelation, making it no longer adequate as an 
ultimate manifestation of the revealer. Of course it is permitted to speak of other 
activities originated by God which also manifest him. But in this way they cannot 
take the strict sense of self-revelation as Barth did, which means they do not reveal 
him in a full and exclusive sense.^ 
Then the problem comes: the bible, to Pannenberg, does witness that the 
epiphanies of God occurred through creaturely medium in his acts. Unless we do not 
count them as revelations of God, Earth's strict sense of revelation solely as direct 
self-revelation of God would become untenable. Moreover since the revelatory 
' R a H , P.3. 
3 Ibid., p.4. 
4 Ibid., pp.4-5. 
5 Ibid.，p.7. 
6 Ibid., P.6. 
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events in the scripture were manifested through creaturely mediums, so more or less 
they are veiled in mystery. But according to Earth's definition, if revelation is truly 
self-revelation, it can only be a manifestation of God himself and any veiling can only 
be handled very cautiously.^ Therefore the reduction of revelation to only direct self-
revelation of God becomes highly problematic. 
Pannenberg tries to argue against Earth's strict sense of direct self-revelation 
from the biblical account. He thinks that in both Testaments we can hardly find any 
word rendered by “to reveal" which has God "himself as the object of action.^ By 
revisiting different key biblical passages, Pannenberg does not only refute the 
definition of revelation as direct self-revelation of God himself, he even criticizes the 
term "Word of God" of any personalistic character, which is only an investment by the 
modern theologians.^ On the contrary, Pannenberg proposes that the words of God 
can only be connected with the history of Israel and primitive Christianity, which 
means that it can only be understood from specific contents.^^ Therefore instead of a 
direct self-revelation of God, Pannenberg points out that revelation is conducted in an 
indirect way, even if it is the self-revelation of God. And he suggests a conception of 
indirect self-revelation as a reflex of God's activity in history}^ 
This conception is particularly important in the development of Pannenberg's 
thought. We may have interest to know how did the Heidelberg circle arrive to this 
idea. So let us hear the words of Pannenberg in one of his autobiological articles: 
When I continued my studies at Heidelberg in the fall of 1950, it was my 
fourth year of theological studies. But I had not yet succeeded, in spite of 
several attempts, really to involve myself in biblical exegesis in addition to 
systematics, philosophy, and church history. After attending a few 
lectures of Gerhard von Rad, however, the dime dropped... In this way 
7 Ibid., p.7. Barth himself also realizes this problem; this is exactly the reason he confines revelation to 
the self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ. But still he has to explain why not everyone can perceive 
this self-revelation. Pannenberg thinks that it is the origin of Earth's supernatural understanding of 
revelation, which can be traced back to the Calvinistic axiom Yinitum non capax infmiti,,. See also 
P.20, ftn. 14; for a brief account of the veiling problem in Earth's theology, see my article "Karl Barth. 
A Revelational Positivist?" (in Chinese�巴特：啓示實証論者？〉），forthcoming in Pan-chiu Lai & 
Sm-Kong Tang ed., Karl Barth and Sino Theology (in Chinese《巴特與漢語神學》）（HK: Institute of 
Sino-Christian Studies, 2000). 
8 RaH, pp.8-9. 
9lbid.,p.l0. 
Ibid., p. 12. 
" lb id . ,p . l3 . 
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the Old Testament, through the aesthetic skill of von Rad's exegesis, came 
alive in the hearts of innumerable students. On the basis of this experience, 
finally the New Testament also began to make sense to me. History was 
the code word of biblical exegesis at Heidelberg in those ears, and to my 
ears it was echoed by the lectures of Karl Lowith on philosophy of history. 
It was a pity, or so it appeared to us students, that systematic theology 
would look like on the basis of von Rad's exegetical vision. This was how 
the so-called Heidelberg Circle started to work/^ 
According to Pannenberg's own account, the Heidelberg Hebrew scholar Gerhard von 
Rad，s idea of history plays an important role in the work of the Heidelberg circle. It 
does not only act as an initiative for them to start their work, it also constitutes the 
heart of the thought of the publication in 1961. As confessed by Pannenberg himself, 
who is not so acquainted with biblical studies, he built his thought upon the concept 
introduced by his teacher. And actually he has never abandoned the idea hereafter. ^ ^ 
Pannenberg elaborates what he means by the conception of an indirect self-
revelation of God as a reflex of his activity in history by making a very important 
point that the mediateness or immediateness in the act of communication is not a 
question, what is particularly important is whether the content of the communication 
can be linked in a direct or indirect way of its intention. i4 That is to say, what is 
crucial for a communication event to be qualified as a direct self-revelation of God 
should have God himself without mediation as its content. But as mentioned above, 
Pannenberg thinks that we can hardly find any scriptural support for this concept. On 
the other hand, indirect self-revelation includes events having God as their originator 
but not having God as the content in any direct manner. But as they are the acts of 
God, they cast light back on God himself and communicate indirectly about God 
himself. In this way Pannenberg speaks of a change of perspective, which means that 
Wolfhart Pannenberg, "An Autobiological Sketch", Carl E. Braaten & Philip Clayton ed” The 
Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg (Minneaplis: Ausburg, 1988), p.14. , 
' ' I n the article "Kerygma and History", we can have a clear perception how profoundly von Rad has 
made an influence on him; and in the second half of this century, when James Barr severely criticized 
the idea of revelation and history as revealed in the works of von Rad, Pannenberg is forced to make a 
lengthy defense in his Systematic Theology Vol. 7; see: Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Kerygma and History" 
B隱 Questions in Theology Vol. 1, pp.81-95, and Systematic Theology Vol. 1, Geoffiey W. Bromiley 
trans. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), Chapter 4, esp. pp.194-195, 230-235. 
RaH, p. 15. ‘ 
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though the content of the events are primarily not concerning God himself, it is 
through reflection of the events that self-revelation is conducted. ^ ^ 
However as God was active in many past events and will continue to carry out 
many things, though they are originated in different ways, they all point back to him. 
Thus it seems that there should be as many revelations as divine activities. In this 
way every individual activity only partially illuminates the being of God, and no one 
single act could claim to be a full revelation of God. Then the strict sense of self-
revelation would be destroyed unless the totality of God's action is regarded as one. 
Pannenberg finds that the legacy of German idealism coincides exactly with this 
thought, which regards the totality of reality in its temporal development as history 
and as the self-communication of God. It is the option he has chosen/^ 
This kind of thought though excludes the problem faced by Earth's theology, 
Pannenberg immediately articulates two questions he has to encounter. First, if only 
in its totality that history is the revelation of God, how can we claim that the Christ 
event, which is a specific event within history, possesses absolute meaning as 
revelation? Second and a related point: in this way then further progress of revelation 
should be expected beyond the Christ event. ^ ^ 
Perceived by Pannenberg, two roads have been laid before him by his 
predecessors. Ernst Troeltsch, on the one hand simply confirmed the frustration to 
prove the absoluteness of Christianity. Another way suggested by Richard Rothe and 
influenced many suggested that the biblical tradition is a “supernatural history". This 
is also the inspiration of the theory of Heilsgeschichte and later induced the so-called 
"Word revelation" concept supplemented to the profane history. ^ ^ To Pannenberg this 
supplementation is very unfortunate, because in this way then the indirect self-
revelation of God is no longer really through history. Therefore the issue lying before 
him is that, how to hold the conception of an indirect self-revelation of God through 
history while at the same time affirm that Jesus Christ in Christian faith having an 
absolute meaning in revelation, when history as a totality is not open to us as a self-








Solution Offered as Dogmatic Theses 
As a member of the Heidelberg circle, based on the exegetical investigations 
in the Old and New Testaments by his companions, Pannenberg formulates his 
solution by seven dogmatic t h e s e s � � F o r c nvenience we first list them out as follows: 
Thesis 1: The self-revelation of God in the biblical witnesses is not of a direct 
type in the sense of a theophany, but is indirect and brought about by 
means of the historical acts of God. 
Thesis 2: Revelation is not comprehended completely in the beginning, but at the 
end of the revealing history. 
Thesis 3: In distinction from special manifestations of the deity, the historical 
revelation is open to anyone who has eyes to see. It has a universal 
character. 
Thesis 4: The universal revelation of the deity of God is not yet realized in the 
history of Israel, but first in the fate of Jesus of Nazareth, insofar as the 
end of all events is anticipated in his fate. 
Thesis 5: The Christ event does not reveal the deity of the God of Israel as an 
isolated event, but rather insofar as it is a part of the history of God 
with Israel. 
Thesis 6: In the formulation of the non-Jewish conceptions of revelation in the 
gentile Christian church, the universality of the eschatological self-
vindication of God in the fate of Jesus comes to actual expression. 
Thesis 7: The word relates itself to revelation as foretelling, forthtelling, and 
report. 
The first thesis thus set is obviously an opposition to the conception of direct 
self-revelation. By means of revisiting biblical passages through both Testaments, 
Pannenberg comes to the conclusion that "the dogmatic conception of revelation must 
first of all orient itself to the chain of tradition, which runs from the Old Testament 
20 "Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of Revelation", RaH, pp. 123-158. 
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through the apocalyptic literature and on the proclamation of Jesus found in the first 
community and in Paul，，.21 
If it is asserted that revelation is to be seen through "a chain of tradition”，then 
thesis 2 is a natural consequence of the previous one, as it tells that revelation can 
only be comprehended completely at the end. But of course another presupposition is 
that the totality of God's action in history is regarded as one but not many. Therefore 
if the divine self-revelation is of an indirect type, its fullness can only be perceived at 
the close of history. 
Pannenberg figures out the implication of this assertion: "Placing the 
manifestation of God at the end of history means that the biblical God has, so to speak, 
his own history.，，22 Because history is the course of God's self-revelation, and self-
revelation means the manifestation of the essence of God's self, thus the course of 
history reveals the essence of God. Pannenberg calls it as a "history-of-religion" 
statement. Its consequence to theology is that, the concept of Heilsgeschichte is 
unnecessary and even meaningless, since revelation is only complete at the end of 
history but not right now, therefore there is no need to suggest another type of 
"sacred" history in contrast to the "profane" one.^^ 
Thinking in this way, if revelation is identified as the course of history, then it 
should not be regarded as any kind of gnostic knowledge of secrets, but it is open for 
natural eyes to see. It is the essence of thesis 3. Pannenberg even adds that “in 
particular, the Holy Spirit is not an additional condition without which the event of 
Christ could not be known as r e v e l a t i o n . ” 24 It is because revelation is not a 
supernatural one but through divine acts in history, though they have to be seen in 
their own traditio-historical context. However Pannenberg does not think that man 
comes to the knowledge of God by his own reason or strength. Instead the divine 
events do have transforming power. So it is not faith which is the basis for finding the 
revelation of God. It is not required for us to confront the event with some special 
attitude. But it is the divine events that make true faith spark?^ 
However that does not mean that faith is superfluous in appropriating the 
knowledge of God. Pannenberg tells that the essence of faith is trust, which is to do 
2ilbid.,p.l31. 
22 Ibid.,p.l33. 
23 Ibid., P.134. 
24 Ibid., p. 136. 
' ' Ibid. , p. 138. 
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with the future. That is to say, one stands firm in his perception of the revelation of 
God, and does not worry about whether this knowledge will alter in the future. 
Pannenberg takes an example that the Christians must be certain that God has been 
revealed in the fate of Jesus Christ, otherwise they cannot place their trust, life and 
future on him. 26 Pannenberg himself also realizes that this definition of faith is 
against the common view, which asserts that faith must remain a risk.�？ And this 
perspective really aroused many discussions. We shall examine this issue in latter 
parts of this essay. 
Up to this point Pannenberg is still dealing with the nature of an indirect type 
of self-revelation of God and its consequences, but not the problem he articulated 
concerning the absoluteness of the revelation as manifested in the fate of Jesus Christ. 
From thesis 4 onwards he is going to tackle with the problem. 
In thesis 4 Pannenberg tells that Jahweh had not proved himself to be a God 
for all men, but only as a tribal God to Israel. It is not until in the fate of Jesus Christ 
as witnessed by the New Testament, that the plan of God is manifested to all men in 
an ultimate way. “For, in him, the resurrection of the dead has already taken place, 
though to all other men this is still something yet to be experienced."^^ Doubtlessly to 
regard a general resurrection of the dead as an eschatological event at the end of 
history must be seen from a certain traditio-historical context, thus in thesis 5 
Pannenberg tells us that we should not take the Christ event as an isolated one, but as 
a part of the history of God with Israel. Making Ulrich Wilkens' exegetical result as 
his basis, Pannenberg demonstrates that the resurrection of Jesus Mfills the Jewish 
prophetic-apocalyptic expectation of the end. Therefore in the fate of Jesus it is 
perceived that the end has already broken in and God is manifested?^ 
But what is it to do with the non-Jewish races? Pannenberg thinks that the 
message of resurrection is also relevant to the gentiles. The primitive church mission 
has already proved this. The resurrection of Jesus successfully confronted the Greek 
concept of the immortality of the soul, though Pannenberg admits that in the history of 
theology the latter thought often overshadowed the hope of resurrection. If we 
26 Ibid., p. 138. 
I r d l o t g & n , n i e 3 g � p “ 2 l � i g h t and Faith，，，Basic Questions in Theology Vol.2, George H. Kehm trans. 
' ' R a H , p.141.‘ ， . . 
29 Ibid., p. 146. 
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translate it into modern form, this hope is still valid for us today. Pannenberg says, 
“The thought about the immortality of the soul was in fact an expression of the 
unending openness of man to go beyond any given situation, so that even death is not 
to be taken as a limit. The modern expression of this would be man's openness to the 
world by the very nature of his constitution."^^ In fact in the period of the primitive 
Christianity, the Christology formulated by the early church plays an important role to 
fit the gentile gnostic thought, thus it made the God who raised Jesus from the dead 
intelligible as God to the gentiles as well as the Jew. This is the theme expressed in 
* 31 
thesis 6. In such a way Pannenberg thinks that the truth of this apocalyptic 
expectation is meaningful to all men in all ages. 
If the resurrection event is so decisive in the revelatory history, then there will 
be no further self-manifestation of God beyond this event. That does not mean that 
God is inactive after the event, but he will not reveal in any fundamentally new way. 
Therefore it is justified to claim that the resurrection of Jesus Christ as an 
eschatological event. With his resurrection, the end of history has already begun. The 
end of the world will be on a cosmic scale what has already happened in Jesus. So the 
New Testament witnesses that in the fate of Jesus Christ the end is experienced by 
means of a foretaste. The fate of the history is anticipated in this one m a n ) � 
However, even if the above argument holds, we can only say that the end of 
the history really is anticipated in the fate of the man Jesus. But according to the strict 
sense of self-revelation, the content of the event should be of the full sense of the 
essence of God. Then what is the content of the essence of God as manifested in this 
eschatological event? Pannenberg thinks that, "in the fate of Jesus, the God of Israel 
is revealed as the triune God. The event of revelation should not be separated from 
the being of God himself. The being of God does not belong just to the Father, but 
also to the son. The Holy Spirit also shares in the being of God by virtue of his 
participation in the glory of God that comes to life in the eschatological 
33 
congregation." Therefore in other words, to Pannenberg, Trinity is the ultimate 
revelation of the God's self, which can be experienced historically. And this 
experience surpasses the incomprehensibility of God in the dualism of the one and the 
3�Ibid. , p. 148. 




many. Thus he thinks that Hegel and Barth are right in grounding the doctrine of 
Trinity in revelation.^^ 
The last thesis deals with a specific topic: the Word of God. Following the 
train of thought so far, the concept does not acquire a gnostic sense which renders 
some direct utterance of the deity about itself. Instead it is understood through God's 
involvement in the course of history as his self-revelation. However Pannenberg has 
never defined what he means by "history" so far in the essay. And here we find some 
very important words of him: "History is not composed of raw or so-called brute facts. 
As the history of man, the history of revelation is always bound up with understanding, 
in hope and remembrance. The development of understanding is itself an event in 
history. In their fundamental givenness, these elements are not to be separated from 
history; history is also the history of the transmission of history."^^ 
If the history of man requires our "understanding" to comprehend, then it must 
be transmitted in some given contexts. As we have seen above, the implication of the 
resurrection of Jesus Christ is also not an exception. So in this last thesis Pannenberg 
has to figure out the relation of the words authorized by God and Jesus to the history 
that God activates. In short, he summarizes the functions of the Word of God in three 
terms: promise, forthtelling and kerygma.^^ We shall not tackle with the detail 
contents of these terms, but what is significant is that Pannenberg has paid most of the 
efforts to explicate his view on the last term, kerygma. He thinks that the essence of 
kerygma is to "report" the eschatological self-vindication of God, which can be done 
in every language, culture and situation.�？ But more important is that, the kerygma 
itself is not a revelatory speech, and thus does not require any inspiration to recognize 
it as revelation. Therefore the church does not possess any revelatory word in her 
sermon. The sermon is only a report of the history as a call to m a n � ^ The thesis thus 
set seems to be a revolt to the so-called kerygmatic theology started from Martin 
Kahler, and followed by Karl Barth. 
^ ^ ^ ^ 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., p. 152. 
36 Ibid., pp. 153-154. 
37 Ibid., p. 154. 
38 Ibid.,p.l55. 
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A Preliminary Analysis 
From the sketch of the agenda illustrated as in Offenbarung als Geschichte, we 
may easily obtain a preliminary perception that, it is a revolt to the Barthian theology. 
In particular, the notion of a strict sense of direct self-revelation of God is the main 
target to be attacked. And the basis of this action is from the inspiration of von Rad's 
Old Testament theology, that the epiphanies of God as witnessed in the Hebrew 
scripture is rarely of a direct type. That is to say, the content is seldom directly 
concerning God's self essence. On the contrary the manifestation of God is mainly 
through his acts in the history of Israel. These divine events cast light back to the 
originator. And it is only through the reflex of the historical activity can we perceive 
the self-revelation of God. Therefore "history" becomes a key word in the agenda of 
I the Heidelberg circle, which is also the code word taken from their inspirer, Gerhard 
j von Rad, confessed by Pannenberg. 
However if history is taken to be the vehicle of revelation, then the opponents 
I would not solely include Karl Barth. Anyone who disregards history as the sufficient 
means to perceive revelation should be included in the list. Consequently Pannenberg 
is very cautious about the school of Heilsgeschichte, and discredits those define faith 
as a leaping in risk. So we hear from one of his most often quoted passage that: 
History is the most comprehensive horizon of Christian theology. All 
theological questions and answers are meaningful only within the 
i framework of the history which God has with humanity and through 
i
! humanity with his whole creation - the history moving toward a future 
still hidden from the world but already revealed in Jesus Christ. This 
presupposition of Christian theology must be defended today within 
theology itself on two sides: on the one side, against Bultmann and 
1 Gogarten's existential theology which dissolves history into historicity of 
j existence; on the other side, against the thesis, developed by Martin Kahler 
in the tradition of redemptive history, that the real content of faith is 
\ supmhistorical.39 
: B Pannenberg, Kahler's tradition of Heilsgeschichte is exactly the root of Earth's 
i| interpretation of the incarnation as "pre-history" (UrgesMchte), while Bultmann's 
I i ’ 
i 39 Wolfliart Pannenberg, "Redemptive Event and History", Basic Questions in Theology VoLl,pA5. 
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existential theology concerns only the historicity of human existence; therefore both 
parties have no intention to ground the redemptive events in "objective" h i s t o r y . S o 
although each one of them has presented their own special features in their theologies, 
Pannenberg regards them both as his adversaries. 
To assert that history is the vehicle of revelation is one thing, but to justify it is 
another. The biblical account, if it is correctly interpreted, gives support to this view. 
But it is only valid for the ancient men and mostly from a Jewish prophetic-
apocalyptic perspective. Moreover, as Pannenberg himself also realizes, how can the 
Christian faith claim that the self-revelation of God in the fate of Jesus Christ has full 
and exclusive meaning, especially it is a particular event occurred within the 
unfinished history? Two points at least have to be investigated more profoundly. 
First, can we really establish the Christ event, especially the resurrection, as an event 
happened in history, such that the revelation is open to any natural eyes to see? 
Second, even if it is a historical event, why it bears a unique meaning for also the non-
Jewish races and even in all ages? For the latter question Pannenberg has tried to 
explain a little in the dogmatic theses, but whether his arguments are sound or not is 
of course questionable. We shall see later in this essay that this eventually becomes 
the crook or hook Pannenberg connects his theological investigation with the history 
of religions. For the former question it seems that he does not mention a word or two 
in this book. Therefore in the next chapter we shall follow this question more closely, 
by examining Pannenberg's other writings in this period, to discover his historical 
method for establishing the historical character of the Christ event, especially 
resurrection, and his hermeneutical method as well to argue for the significance of the 
Christ event as the ultimate self-revelation of God, when the totality of history is still 




History and Hermeneutics 
In the last chapter we have seen that to justify the assertion "revelation as 
history", and at the same time the Christian claim that "the self-revelation of God in 
the fate of Jesus Christ acquires a decisive meaning”，there is a need to demonstrate 
the historical character of the Christ event. If it cannot be ascertained as a historical 
event, then it is meaningless for the Christian faith to take it as a self-revelation of 
God in history. Without doubt, the most crucial point of this issue is about the 
resurrection event. 
But even if the historical character of the resurrection can be established, 
Pannenberg still has to justify that the Christ event is the high point of the self-
revelation of God in history, which today is still on its way of completion and not laid 
bare before us. To assert a particular event in history has a decisive meaning is 
identical to speak of the meaning of a part within the whole process, which is a 
hermeneutical problem. Just then in the 60s the magnum opus of the German 
hermeneutics philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode appeared. 
Pannenberg has grasped this important chance to have dialogue with this scholar. We 
shall see that his thought has made a great advance through this dialogue. 
/••s^  /'"s,^  
Pannenberg's Historical Method 
In "Redemptive Event and History" Pannenberg writes, “it is usual today to 
regard historical research and the history of the promises of God as belonging to two 
completely different spiritual planes." ^ According to the above discussion, if 
Pannenberg's aim is to demonstrate the historical character of the resurrection as well 
as other redemptive events, then his first task must be the reconciliation of the two 
disciplines. To achieve the task, Pannenberg chooses Ernst Troeltsch as his partner in 
1 Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Redemptive Event and History", Basic Questions in Theology Vol.1, p.38; 
hereafter abbreviated as REaH. ， ， 
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the discussion. The selection is not arbitrary. Besides Troeltsch is generally regarded 
as an important figure in historical theology, he has been claiming that the principles 
necessary for scientific historiography are “at all points an absolute contrast" to the 
central beliefs of Christian theology.^ Therefore it is very essential for Pannenberg to 
revise and criticize Troeltsch's historical method. 
Ted Peters has summarized Troeltsch's historical method as three interrelated 
principles: 3 
(1) Principle of criticism: our judgments about the past are not classified as proofs, 
but rather they always claim a greater or lesser degree of probability, and as 
such are always open to revision. 
(2) Principle of analogy: such judgments of probability can be made only if we 
presuppose that our present experience is analogous to that of past persons. 
(3) Principle of correlation: all historical phenomena are so interdependent and 
related, that no change can occur at one point in the historical nexus without 
effecting a change in all that immediately surrounds it. 
Pannenberg himself has no difficulty to adopt principles (1) and (3) into his 
discussion, 4 but he hesitates to swallow up principle (2) entirely, thinking that 
Troeltsch has gone further than enough and he even criticizes him as unnecessarily 
"anthropocentric". 
Pannenberg thinks that, "according to Troeltsch, historical method rests on the 
'application of analogy', which includes 'the fundamental homogeneity 
{Gleichartigkeit) of all historical events', as well as on the presupposition of a 
universal correlation, the 'reciprocity of all manifestations of spiritual-historical life."^ 
Pannenberg finds no opposition between historical method and a theological 
understanding of history with respect to the principle of universal correlation. On the 
contrary, he thinks that the writings of the ancient Near East as well as primitive 
Christianity coincide with this view. "That every historical process is reciprocally 
connected to events in its environment entirely forbids theological study of history 
from taking the biblical witnesses and the events attested by them in isolation by 
2 Ernst Troeltsch, "Historiography", James Hastings ed., Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (NY-
Scribner's, 1914)，vol. 6, p.718. 
3 TedPelers, "The Use of Analogy in Historical Method", The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 35(1973), 
4 See REaH, pp.39-53 and the following discussion. 
5 Ibid., p.40. 
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themselves.”6 Thus any attempt to delimit redemptive history as a realm of a different 
kind from the rest of history is theologically unacceptable.^ 
The problem of historical criticism then, Pannenberg thinks, arises out of the 
employment of the principle of analogy. By analogy, Pannenberg means for the 
comparative method that when something is opaque and difficult to be conceived, the 
investigator would understand in terms of what lies closer to him. 8 In other words, 
one concludes something unknown always by others which are already known, this is 
the essence and the power of the method of analogy. However this method also 
brings great constriction to the historical-critical inquiry, since it presupposes that all 
historical events must possess a fundamental homogeneity. Pannenberg thinks that 
this assumption is plausible and would hinder the historian to perceive the 
particularity and uniqueness of some phenomena. The origin of the problem, to 
Pannenberg, is that any observer can only perceive things from his own viewpoint, 
and this point always arises out of some already given worldview, which is never 
value-free.^ However there is no warranty that the observer has possessed the only 
viewpoint. If anything can be rendered as historical only by examining its 
homogeneity with the already happened thing, then it is assumed by an "omnipotence 
of analogy". It is this "without remainder" assumption that leads Pannenberg criticize 
Troeltsch as unnecessarily anthropocentric.� The result of the monopoly of the 
employment of analogy in historical method is that, all the particularities of matters 
would be leveled down. To Pannenberg this immanentist worldview does not do 
justice to the openness of the future. Therefore he encourages the historians to 
concentrate upon the dissimilarities and particularities of historical events, but not 
only the similarities. For a historian, both should bring him equally vital concern. ” 
This conclusion is highly significant for Christian theology. To Pannenberg, 
since God is free from every cosmic order, he constantly gives rise to something new 
in reality within his divine activity in history. Therefore theology is interested 
primarily in the individual, particular and contingent things. ^ ^ It is exactly because of 





1�Ted Peters, p.478. 
11 REaH, p.46. 
12 Ibid., p.48. 
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13 research and theology. Since as God always creates something new, one can hardly 
find any homogenous point to the past, thus the historical-critical procedure seems apt 
to exclude any transcendent reality. As a consequence, the resurrection event if not 
rendered as "unhistorical", it can at most be regarded as "suprahistorical" or 
"transhistorical". Both are unacceptable to a theology regarding revelation as history. 
However Pannenberg is not completely denying the use of analogy in 
historical research. What he finds unacceptable, as we have mentioned before, is that 
Troeltsch has gone too far than necessary. Pannenberg thinks that the principle is 
really basic to the historical-critical method, so that we may regard something as 
historical by comparing it with other already established events. Pannenberg calls this 
"positive" use of analogy. ^ ^ What he cannot accept is the "negative" use of analogy, 
which works in the opposite direction. That means if an event which cannot find to be 
homogenous to other historical events, then it is regarded as unhistorical. As we have 
mentioned before, Pannenberg thinks that this principle does not do justice to the 
openness of the future and presupposes an analogy of omnipotence, thus it is not 
acceptable. On the contrary, Pannenberg suggests that if we really employ the 
positive use of analogy, we must use it to the end. If one cannot find an event to be 
homogenous to others, then it is not to be discarded as unhistorical, instead we have to 
consider it as something historically unique. 
Taking the resurrection event as an example, Pannenberg in Jesus — God and 
Man writes: 
Historical inquiry always takes place from an already given context of 
meaning, out of a preimderstanding of the object of inquiry, which, 
however, is modified and corrected in the process of research on the basis 
of the phenomena examined. As long as historiography does not begin 
dogmatically with a narrow concept of reality according to which "dead 
men do not rise", it is not clear why historiography should not in principle 
be able to speak about Jesus' resurrection as the explanation that is best 
established of such events as the disciples' experiences of the appearances 
and the discovery of the empty tomb.^ '^ 
13 Ibid.，p.43. 
”Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Response to Discussion", James M. Robinson & John B. Cobb Jr ed 
Theology as History (NY: Harper & Row, 1967), pp.264-265, esp. ftn. 75. , , 
‘Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus - God and Man,ht^xs L. Wilkins & Duane A. Priebe trs. (London. SCM 
1992), p.109. ‘ 
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Peters correctly comments that, Pannenberg is not to renounce the principle of 
analogy entirely, but distinguish it as a tool for modern historical research and an 
antitheistic worldview or ontology. ^ ^ However we must also be aware that, by such 
treatment Pannenberg has not absolutely established the historicity of resurrection in 
the common sense, what he has done is "to make room for the historical credibility of 
the resurrection as an event without analogy".^^ 
According to Pannenberg's thought, if openness is to be allowed for the future, 
then anything rendered as dissimilar and particular today may become a reference for 
things to come in the future. Resurrection then cannot be an exception. ^ ^ Therefore it 
is questionable for taking the resurrection of Jesus Christ as the decisive point of the 
self-revelation of God in the whole history. In addition, as we have read from 
Offenbarung als Geschichte, Pannenberg also realizes that history is not only 
composed by brute facts. History is also the history of the transmission of history 
(Thesis 7). It requires us to "understand" it. The fate of Jesus Christ, especially his 
resurrection, as the fiill revelation is already such kind of understanding. It does not 
tell merely of a man Jesus of Nazareth has risen from death at a certain time，but it is 
also regarded as a divine revelation and even the end of all events are said to be 
anticipated in the fate of this man (Thesis 4). How can we guarantee this claim when 
the history is not a self-contained unit laid bare to us? The historical method is only 
the first and fundamental problem, in the following we shall continue to see 
Pannenberg's hermeneutical method. 
Pannenberg's Hermeneutical Method 
As early in 1959 when "Redemptive Event and History" appears, Pannenberg 
is aware of the hermeneutical problem in his theological program. In the discussion 
of making revelatory history as a problem of historical method he says, "it is the 
horizon of world history which first makes it possible to appreciate the full 
16 Ted Peters, p.475. 
' ' lbid. ,p.481. 
18 Whether resurrection of Jesus is an established event is already problematic, but it is beyond the 
scope of our discussion, for Pannenberg's own discussion, see Jesus — God and Man, pp.88-105. 
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significance of an individual event". ^ ^ But to take world history as a horizon, the first 
question to be encountered is: "how is the conception of a unity of history 
• 20 
possible?" At that time Pannenberg cannot offer a good historical or philosophical 
answer. Instead, after a review of some contemporary historians, especially 
Collingwood, Pannenberg appeals to the theological doctrine that God is the Creator 
of the world, in which we can find the unity of the contingencies in history. It is not 
until the next year when Gadamer's Wahrheit und Methode was first published, he can 
find better resource for his thought. Therefore it is very important to see how 
Pannenberg was stimulated by the great hermeneutics philosopher. 
Among the many concepts in the magnum opus, Pannenberg finds the idea of 
"fusion of horizons" (Horizontverschmelzung) particularly innovative. ^^  He 
summarizes the process by three steps: (1) the interpreter becomes aware of the 
temporal distance between the text and the horizon he has brought with him; (2) he 
builds up a new, comprehensive horizon; (3) and thereby succeeds in moving beyond 
the limits of his original preconception and formulation of the question.^� The process 
is stimulating to him because in due course the horizon of the interpreter is not 
something rigid but ever changing. This idea reinforces his historical method as 
explicated above, that the interpreter or historian cannot regard his own viewpoint as 
the absolute one, openness should be allowed for the future. Moreover, as we have 
also mentioned above, the ultimate goal of historical critical method, to Pannenberg, 
is not merely establishing the historicity of brute facts, but also to understand the 
meaning of particular events within the entire world history. But as the history is not 
finished yet, it becomes a question for him to explore the appropriate method. 
Gadamer's methodology is also relevant to this task. Since in the moment of building 
up a new comprehensive horizon to bridge up the text and the interpreter, a "creative" 
action is required for him to embrace the old and new things. Pannenberg grasps this 
important point and tells that though the entire history is not yet completed, for a 
reflective interpretation we are always obliged to project a comprehensive horizon 
19 REaH, p.69. 
，Ibid. , p.68. 
Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Hermeneutic and Universal History", Basic Questions in Theology Vol. 1, 
p.117; hereafter abbreviated as HaUH. ‘ 
22 Ibid., p. 119. 
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which can embrace the whole reality?^ This so-called universal history is exactly the 
horizon Pannenberg is seeking for his theological program. 
It is also at this point Pannenberg breaks with the philosopher. In order to 
avoid a total mediation of history as demonstrated in Hegel's philosophy of spirit in 
mind, Gadamer withdraws from the concept of universal history. He insists that the 
concept is speculative and contradicts to human fmitude of knowing process? The 
actual hindrance, Gadamer thinks, is that the hermeneutical process is in fact a 
linguistic process. It is language but not the speculative universal history which 
serves as the universal medium for understanding?^ 
Pannenberg honours Gadamer's intention to preserve the human fmitude of 
understanding, and even agrees with him that language plays an essential role in the 
interpretive process. What makes him no longer follow Gadamer is that he does not 
regard interpretation as merely a language event. Pannenberg thinks that some 
objectification processes must accompany with it?^ However it does not follow that 
Pannenberg is confident to have already embraced the entire world history. On the 
contrary, he baldly admits that the concept of universal history is speculative. It can 
be a means for our interpretive process as well as an obstacle to open up new 
possibilities. However, he thinks that it just simply demonstrates the fmitude of 
human thought. Therefore we are summoned to produce ever better universal 
* 27 
history! Pannenberg thinks that this imperative is actually the most natural 
consequence of Gadamer's formulation of the hermeneutical event as "fusion of 
horizons". Only within such a context we can really link the past with the present 
situation and future vision. It is because of Gadamer devaluing the objectification 
vector of language to reality that makes him feel embarrassed to speak of such a 
universal horizon.^^ Instead of avoiding the concept, Pannenberg suggests that we 
should today develop a new conception of universal history. But it should be one 
which is in contrast to Hegel's, one that can preserve the human fmitude. In addition, 
Pannenberg does not think that the conception would merely be a speculation, instead 
23 Ibid., p. 120. 
24 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans (NY-
Continuum, 1995), pp.341-346. • 
�Ib id . , pp .381-405 . 
- H a U H , pp.123-128; Pannenberg also elaborates his view within a broader perspective in a later stage 
see: Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, Francis McDonagh trans (London' 
Darton, Longman & 丁odd，1976), pp.177-184. 
27 HaUH, p. 134. 
28 Ibid.,pp.l29-132. 
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something about the future is truly provisionally or proleptically known. The content 
is that the end of all events is already anticipated in the fate of Jesus Christ. Hegel 
was unable to develop such a concept because, says Pannenberg, the New Testament 
exegesis at that time was not as advance as his days, so that the eschatological 
character of Jesus' message remained hidden to him!29 
/"Nw/ 
Synthesis of the Results of the Historical and Hermeneutical Methods 
Up to this point, Pannenberg has already created room for the historical 
credibility of the resurrection event, and also a concept of universal history as the 
hermeneutical framework to perceive its meaning for the entire history. Now we can 
continue to see the significance of these results in his theological program. 
We may summarize Pannenberg's arguments by the following points:^^ 
(1) Though the method of analogy is required for historical method, it must be 
sufficiently flexible to include the unprecedented, and even such a radically 
unique and unprecedented event as the resurrection of Jesus. 
(2) The meaning of an event cannot be isolated from its historicity. But the 
meaning must be seen against the context of the universal history. While the 
universal history has an anticipatory character, meaning of any individual 
event must as a consequence carry the same character. 
(3) This anticipation of universal meaning inherently presses for confirmation by 
the totality of man's experience of reality at any time whatever. ^^  Openness 
to the future thus belongs to the essential structure of human existence, 
especially in the interpretive process. 
(4) To its radical form, the hopeful expectation of life's unlimited fulfillment 
beyond death belongs also to this openness to future. The late Judeo and 
early Christian framework of apocalyptic, with its hope of the resurrection of 
all men, is now seen to have validity upon this general anthropological fact of 
man's openness to the future and his hope of unlimited fulfillment. 
29 Ibid., pp.l34-135. 
= C f . Iain G. Nicol，"Facts and Meanings", Religious Studies 12(1976), pp.132-134. 
31 Wolfhart Pannenberg, "On Historical and Theological Hermeneutic", Basic Questions in Theology 
Vol.1, p. 141; hereafter abbreviated as OHaTH. 
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Now, if the resurrection of Christ is allowed for historical credibility (1), which fulfills 
the Judeo-Christian apocalyptic and general anthropological structure of openness to 
the future (4), then it presses us to anticipate its meaning against the universal history 
(2), that is a general resurrection which is already conformed to totality of man's 
experience of reality (3). 
From the above simple illustration, a very important point has to be noticed, 
that is by his historical and hermeneutical methods, Pannenberg has successfully 
formulated a hermeneutical circle, which is substantiated by means of rational and 
historical enquiry. The historical knowledge of God's revelation in Jesus precedes 
faith and does not presuppose faith. However, a very subtle point is to be noticed, i.e. 
the historical method he proposes is no longer the one we use ordinarily. Seen against 
his hermeneutical circle, we may come to conclude that this historical method which 
emphasizes radically the use of positive analogy, has also carried an anticipatory 
character. That is to say, as we have mentioned repeatedly, historicity of certain 
unique event, say resurrection, has gained only historical credibility, its confirmation 
is carried forth into the future. Therefore in the thesis 4 of Offenbarung als 
Geschichte Pannenberg says that "faith has to do with the future. This is the essence 
of trust.”32 But trust in what? In "Redemptive Event and History" Pannenberg has a 
more detail elaboration: 
But faith is actually trust in God's promise... Believing trust directs itself 
toward the future fulfillment of the sure promise on which it is grounded. 
Faith is characterized as fides non apparentium [faith in what is unseen] only 
because it directs itself toward what is coming (and toward the coming, 
effective, invisible G o d ) ” 
Thus the ultimate verdict is not placed here and now, but in the future, and 
anticipation (vorzulaufen) consequently becomes a catchword in his theology.34 To 
justify this anticipation and altogether his hermeneutical program are not just mere 
subjective conviction, except by appealing to general anthropology, Pannenberg has to 
make reference to the whole of reality. The trick is that, God, to Pannenberg, is 
conceived as the all-determining power. Thus speaking about God is identical to 
32RaH，p_138. 
"REaH,p.65. 
34 See especially OHaTH. 
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speaking about the whole of reality.^^ The conception conforms to his program set 
forth in Offenharung als Geschichte, in which Pannenberg argues that if history is 
regarded as the course of God's self-revelation, then history reveals the essence of 
God (Thesis Under this light it is reasonable that openness to future and 
anticipation are so crucial to Pannenberg's program. Since they provide the basis for 
us to conceive the contingencies in history; they act as an essential structure to human 
understanding; more important they are rooted in God, the all-determining reality, 
who is the origin of the contingency in the world by his freedom, only in whom can 
the whole of reality find its unity.^^ 
/""s^  
Different Aspects Reconsidered 
After this breath-holding explication, let us reconsider some aspects the 
program bringing forth to us. 
First of all, let us continue with an unfinished business, that is about the nature 
of faith. David Holwerda criticizes Pannenberg that he has not overcome the problem 
of the transition from the probabilities of historical reason to the certainty of faith.^^ 
In connection, John V. Apczynski notes that the final verification of Pannenberg's 
claim is eschatological. Thus he accuses him of presupposing an ability to understand 
the truth claims of a religious tradition provided by the experience of faith.^^ In other 
words, what they are not contended with Pannenberg is that the historical method 
presented does not appear to them to be sufficient for establishing the certainty 
required. However I think that the criticisms and the like can only knock down the 
man of straw. Pannenberg himself has never come to the conclusion that by reason 
alone one can come to the knowledge of God.40 On the contrary, he emphasizes that 
35 Ibid.,p.l56. 
36 RaH,p.l33. 
37 REaH, pp.74-75. 
38 
David Holwerda, "Faith, Reason and the Resurrection in the Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg", 
Alvin Plantinga & Nicholas Wolterstorff ed., Faith and Rationality (Notre Dame- University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1983), p.306. 
力 John V. Apczynski, "Integrative Theology: A Polanyian Proposal for Theological Foundations" 
Theological Studies 40(1979), pp.34-35. , 
40 SeeRaH,p. l37. 
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faith is not superfluous. But it is not a subjective conviction to compensate defective 
knowledge . 
What makes it so confusing, I think, is that we have not grasped the essence of 
aligning revelation as history. Traditionally, God is often perceived as transcendent in 
the sense that he is beyond the reach of history. Therefore there is always a tendency 
for theologians to regard faith as something "additive" to historical knowledge, so that 
by it we can come to the knowledge of God from above. To Pannenberg it is exactly 
the origin of the conceptions of Heilsgeschichte and pre-history. Against this view he 
radically abandons the differentiation of two histories, and combines them together, 
i.e. the secular history is the same as the sacred one. The result is that, revelation is 
neither in nor through history, but as history. The essence of history becomes the 
essence of God. Therefore if history is on his course of completion, then God can 
only be comprehended completely at the eschaton. God, in some sense, is history,�^ 
and is the all-determining power from the future.仏 In this way the "transcendental 
axis” from above which is originally perpendicular to the temporal axis of the world 
history, is now tilted ninety degrees to form an alignment. It is because God is no 
longer above our head, instead he is before our steps. Thus according to the vector 
direction of our ordinary notion of time, Pannenberg can claim that we have first the 
historical knowledge and then put our trust into the coming future. And faith is 
exactly this trust. So it is said that faith is neither a presupposition nor superfluous. 
However some commentators formulates their criticism from the opposite 
direction. William Hamilton thinks that if God is rendered as the process of history 
and the all-determining power from the future, and the ultimate verdict of historical 
method is placed at the eschaton, then in fact we can in no way conclude that God is 
not there.44 So he thinks that Pannenberg is simply begging the question he set for 
himself. He proposes God to exert his power from the future to the present, and 
summons us to find him here and now, and his manifestation would be complete at the 
end of history. If we follow Pannenberg's tilted transcendental axis more thoroughly, 
we should not regard our ordinary temporal vector as his methodological direction. 
41 REaH, pp.64-65. 
42 William Hamilton, "The Character of Pannenberg's Theology", James M. Robinson & John B. Cobb, 
Jr. eds., Theology as History, pp.185-186. , 
4 �F o r a more profound account of this idea, see Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Theology and the Kingdom of 
God’，，Theology and the Kingdom of God, Richard John Neuhaus ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969). 
hereafter abbreviated as TaKG. ‘ ， 
44 William Hamilton, pp. 185-186. 
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Since God is first and foremost placed at the eschaton, the vector direction should 
work backward from the eschaton on our temporal axis. Therefore Hamilton offers 
his critical comment saying: 
Pannenberg's subjectivism is not that of experience but of historical 
methodology. But his way seems fully as escapist as does Bultmann's.'^^ 
Some people may find the word "escapist" too strong. In fact it may be that no one of 
us can avoid some sort of presupposition. However, if one were looking for a kind of 
radically open-ended system as process theologians do, then they would probably be 
disappointed by Pannenberg's scheme/^ It is because Pannenberg allows only a 
limited openness to his proposal with some fixed eschatological criteria. Nevertheless, 
still I hesitate to agree with Hamilton's label of “subjectivism，，，because though within 
Pannenberg's system some eschatological premises are set, he has never denied that 
we can refute the premise with his system as a whole. The crucial point is that, to 
Pannenberg Christianity must embrace some fixed eschatological criteria, and the 
ultimacy of the revelation in Jesus Christ is also perceived from this perspective. As a 
consequence, Pannenberg's system is constructed upon this basis. However, while 
Christianity cannot loosen this premise, there is a question whether Pannenberg's 
theological system must uphold it. But if this premise is really open for challenge, 
then his third dogmatic thesis "the historical revelation is open to anyone who has 
eyes to see" may appear too strong. We shall see that this tension haunts him 
hereafter and becomes in his latter thought an important issue, thus makes him shift to 
a more moderate position.^? 
The second issue we shall take up concerns the nature of dogmatic statement 
and truth. This issue is related because Pannenberg has once expressed that revelation 
is designated as the norm set over dogma and the criterion of dogma.48 Therefore the 
task of dogmatics is to question the agreement of dogmas with revelation.49 However, 
if revelation can only be comprehended completely at the end, then dogmatic 
45 Ibid., p. 193. 
46 For this issue, see Lewis S. Ford, "Whiteheadian Basis for Pannenberg's Theology", Encounter 38 
(1977), p.313; and Robert Jenson, The Triune Identity (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), p. 172. 
” W e shall see that Pannenberg is forced to make amendment to this thesis in his Systematische 
Theologie, see the discussion in Chapter 6. 
48 Wolfhart Pannenberg, "What is a Dogmatic Statement?", Basic Questions in Theology Vol.1, p. 183; 
hereafter abbreviated as WDS. ‘ ‘ 
49 Ibid., p. 184. 
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statement under this definition can hardly claim to have ultimate validity. In addition, 
if the God Christians believe is the one uniting all reality by his all-determining power, 
then the truth Christian faith concerns is not a particular one among many, but the 
truth itself which in essence can only be one.^^ Eventually we must come to ask about 
the nature of dogmatic statement. 
Let us recall the dogmatic theses on the doctrine of revelation set forth in 
Offenbarung als Geschichte. Although the self-revelation of God can only be 
comprehended completely at the end, there exists an event in the midst of the course 
of history, through which the end of all events is already anticipated, i.e. the Christ 
event. Since in Christ the consummation of history has already begun, a proleptic 
conception of the whole of reality is anticipated. Through this telescope constituted 
by the Easter event, dogmatic statements can acquire a proleptic character because the 
universal meaning inheres in this particular event.^^ That is not to say that we can 
have already unalterable truth present at hand, dogma is still on its way of making but 
not acquires an eschatological form yet. This is why our doctrines and hence 
traditions are still under revision, this is the sign of “not yet”. 52 But tradition as 
tradition means in which a continuity is preserved. This universality thus 
demonstrated is grounded in the proleptic character of Christ event. Theologians of 
different ages have been working to the same norm, therefore it is reflected to be 
decisive in the self-revelation of God.^^ Thus dogmatic statement is only provisional 
but has a doxological character. 54 On the other side of the coin, we may say that truth 
has a historical character, and truth as whole is available only at the end of the 
historical process. However because the flill revelation of God is already manifested 
in the fate of Jesus Christ, we can have a proleptic view of reality and thus the truth 
while still preserving the openness to history.^^ 
From this simple formulation we can see that the hermeneutical circle formed 
by Pannenberg does not only offer a self-explanatory system，it can also entail a 
theology rich of implication. In this case, the problem of the nature of dogmatic 
Wolfhart Pannenberg, "What is Truth?", Basic Questions in Theology Vol.2, p . l ; hereafter 
abbreviated as WT. 




For a more detail account, see WT; for a philosophically formulated version of the issue, see 
Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Appearance as the Arrival of the Future", TaKG, pp. 127-143; also Ronald D. 
Pasquariello, "Pannenberg's Philosophical Foundations", The Journal of Religion 56(1976): 338-347. 
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statement and the quest of truth is encountered. Of course, by similar arguments as 
we have offered when dealing with the problem of faith, we may easily find that 
Pannenberg has actually given a "limited-open" system. Nevertheless, if we examine 
more closely, we shall find that it is "limited-open" in the sense of presupposing a 
definite consummation of history, while no one can deny that certain openness is still 
reserved for the details within the historical process. This is the very point 
Pannenberg's system differs from Hegel's one.^^ What makes the difference, i.e. the 
basis of the openness to the future, Pannenberg thinks, is also the proleptic character 
of the destiny of Jesus, despite its ultimate character in the self-revelation of God.^^ 
As we have seen before, to Pannenberg, Hegel's inability to achieve this result 
is due to the New Testament exegesis was not so advance as his at Hegel's time.^^ 
Recalling the four arguments we have summarized by Pannenberg's hermeneutical 
circle, readers may find that point (3) and (4) are in fact neither explainable by his 
historical nor hermeneutical method. It is asserted that the resurrection event fulfills 
the Judeo-Christian apocalyptic and even general human expectation of life's 
unlimited fulfillment beyond death. However this claim holds only when seen against 
a particular traditio-historical context. To this Pannenberg admits baldly in thesis 4 
illustrated in Ojfenbarung als Geschichte. While at that time he was only aware of 
the dilemma that Jesus Christ as the ultimate self-revelation of God in history, which 
is in essence God's self-revelation, is not yet finished, he was dealing with a problem 
concerning the history-of-(Judeo-Christian)religion. However when his historical-
hermeneutical circle is established and the question of the universality of theology 
emerges, Pannenberg can no longer ignore the question: why a history of a particular 
race is considered of extraordinarily significance? This is the starting point for him to 
enter into the discussion of history of religions. 
We have intentionally left the question only preliminarily touched before 
Pannenberg's early theological framework is discussed. Now we have enough 
preparation to enter into our main theme of discussion: how does Pannenberg deal 
with the problem of the history of religions and how does he perceive the special role 
played by the Judeo-Christian religion, especially the full self-revelation of God as 
manifested in Jesus Christ. 
56 WT, p.22. 
57 Ibid” P.25. 
58 HaUH, p.135. 
29 
Chapter 4 
Toward a Theology of the History of Religions 
In 1965 Paul Tillich offered his last public lecture in Chicago, summoning 
Christian theologians to adopt the history of religions into the approach of theology. 
Pannenberg responds to the challenge by revising a lecture delivered in 1962 in 
Berlepsch, the name of which is exactly the same as our essay: “Toward a Theology 
of the History of Religions". ^ This is the first document Pannenberg addresses 
directly to the issue. In the following we shall try to see its connection to his 
theological program set thus far. In such treatment, we shall also discover the 
problems implicit in the article; they can be seen as a continuum from his early 
program. 
/•"•s^  /•Nw' 
The Problem Perceived by Pannenberg 
Pannenberg thinks that to adopt the history of religions into theology is on the 
one hand a clear departure from the kerygmatic theology prevailing in Germany at 
that time, but on the other hand it is an omen to return to the problem set forth by 
Ernst Troeltsch, who regards that justifying Christianity as an absolute religion is an 
* 2 
impasse. Therefore the quest laid before him is to prove that: 
The ultimacy of the Christian revelation can be illuminating, not as a 
supranaturalistic presupposition, but only if it can result from an 
unprejudiced understanding of the total process of the universal history of 
religion.^ 
1 Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Toward a Theology of the History of Religions", Basic Questions in Theology 
Vol.2, pp.65-118; hereafter abbreviated as TTHoR. 
“Ibid., pp.65-68. 
3 Ibid., P.69. 
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Pannenberg thinks that Tillich's call for such a new theology requires us to make 
structural comparison between different religions. In due course we shall discover the 
peculiarity of Christianity in the historical process, if it is really absolute.^ 
If we compare this agenda with the one set in Offenbarung als Geschichte, we 
shall find out some "structural" similarities. In the former publication, the point to be 
opposed is placing the self-revelation of God in any kind of "suprahistory" such as 
Heilsgeschichte or pre-history. To align the self-revelation of God with history, the 
major problem to be sort out is the justification of the fate of Jesus Christ as the high 
point of revelation in the entire historical process while it is not yet finished. 
Therefore something must be particular to the Christ event and at the same time 
relevant to the whole historical process. Thus he has to encounter with the problems 
of historical and hermeneutical methods. Now the problem is so similar that if we 
regard the kerygmatic theology as subjectivistic by its character, then a return to the 
study of the history of religions is a must. However since the universal history of the 
human kind is not yet finished, it seems that any claim of an ultimacy by a particular 
religion, including Christianity, must be an impasse. This is the dead knot posed by 
Troeltsch. 
In his previous program, as a Christian theologian, Pannenberg mainly focuses 
on the problem formulated by his predecessors. Thus his discussion remains in the 
Judeo-Christian tradition. Now stimulated by Tillich, Pannenberg can no longer avoid 
coming across the issue of the multiplicity of religious tradition. But as we have seen 
the agenda thus set is so similar to that he dealt with before, we shall find that 
Pannenberg's attempt to the problem complies the methodology he ever used. 
/"v,^  
The Solution Proposed by Pannenberg 
To Pannenberg, if we do not want to start with any partiality from whatever 
particular religion, the study of the history of religions must adopt some scientific 
method free from presupposition. Phenomenological method takes up the role, thinks 
Pannenberg, and it is also the dominant method among the sciences of religion at that 
4lbid.,pp.70-71. 
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t i m e . � B y phenomenological method, Pannenberg means the one concentrating on the 
"phenomenon" of religious life, while at the same time detaching them from their 
historical contexts，To him, Gerardus van der Leeuw and Mircea Eliade are the 
representatives. By such treatment, individual phenomena of different religions are 
placed side by side in a systematic way to perceive their similarity, and even a general 
pattern of religious experience is constructed. Thus Asclepius, Apollo and Jesus can 
be placed side by side as saviour figures; the accolade and circumcision, formulations 
from the Upanishads and century Catholic pastoral letters are comparable.^ 
However, Pannenberg thinks that this kind of generalization may lead us astray, 
since "the more it abstracts from the historical particularity of its material, the less it is 
able empirically to distinguish between superficial and essential mutualities."^ In 
simpler term, what he is not contended with the present method is that it shows no 
interest for "historical peculiarity".^ He says: 
Thus, in point of fact the phenomenology of religion makes a significant 
contribution to a preliminary anthropology of religious experience... it must 
presuppose the fundamental categories for such a description of the 
religious attitude as having already been provided from another quarter.工。 
Thus, the heart of his attack is this method has already set rigid limits to the structure 
of human behaviour, while human being is actually a historical being and changes in 
the historical process, u Therefore the particularities emerged should be given due 
significance instead of leveling them down. 
Readers at this point may realize that we have come across a very similar kind 
of saying before. When Pannenberg deals with the historical critical method of his 
days, what he cannot accept is not the principle of analogy entirely, but the 
unnecessary discarding of any particular data if they are not homogenous to the things 
have come. The purpose is to leave room for the historical credibility of resurrection. 
Pannenberg now has got a similar opinion. What he does not satisfy with is not the 
entire phenomenological method, but its inability to grant credit to particular religious 
5 Ibid., p.72. 
6 Ibid., pp.73-74. 
7 Ibid., p.74. 
8lbid.,p.75. 
9 Ibid., p.74 
Ibid., p.77. 
11 Ibid., p.78. 
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phenomenon in history. This would create a great obstacle for him to claim the 
uniqueness of Christianity in the history of religions. 
Therefore instead of a self-enclosed type of investigation method, Pannenberg 
suggests to study the history of religion as really a continuum. To him, Hegel has 
already set an example. But his account is still a static one which does not do justice 
to things particular and irrepeatable. So the quest lying before him is to perceive the 
whole history of religions without leveling down any particularities. 
As we have seen from the last chapter, to complete the hermeneutical circle of 
his theological program, the fundamental problem for Pannenberg is to justify the 
unity of history. The crux needed he found in the interpretive process of human 
understanding. To justify the unity of the history of religions, Pannenberg tries a 
similar way, and he reaches also a similar conclusion at the end. 
Pannenberg tries to persuade us that the history of religions is a unity by 
articulating some previous historical fragments. For example, the God of Israel is in 
fact originated from at least three or four traditions, viz., the Kenite Yahweh of Sinai, 
the god of the Exodus, the gods of the Patriarchs and El the god of heaven. Thus the 
biblical figure of God has actually gone through a syncretistic process. Pannenberg 
claims that similar processes can also be found in the history of the Egyptian Amon 
and other Egyptian gods, Marduk of Babylon, and Greek gods such as Apollo or Zeus. 
Christianity also demonstrated the same syncretistic assimilative power in the 
Mediterranean world, says Pannenberg, and he restates the words of Hermann Gunkel 
that "Christianity is a syncretistic religion". ^ ^ What Pannenberg wants to show is 
history has already shown us that religions have the tendency to be unified. Different 
religions tried to convince other groups by providing better basis for the orders of 
human existence or mediating salvation to human being. ^ ^ So when other factors such 
as political and economic situations also provide suitable environment, collision of 
different religions would give rise to competition and a "higher" form of religion 
would r e m a i n . " Therefore “the unity of the history of religions is therefore not to be 
found in their beginnings, but rather in their end."^^ So to speak, it is a general 
12 Ibid., pp.86-87. 
13 Ibid., p.88. 
14 Ibid.,p.93. 
15 Ibid., P.94. 
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religious phenomenon in human history, and Christian mission has also demonstrated 
similar process when Christianity encounters with different religions in the world] 6 
Then comes the question what is the reference for the competition of religions? 
To which criteria do they fight against each other? Pannenberg thinks that the 
competition is grounded with reference to the reality (Wirklichkeitsbezug). ^^ As 
different peoples understand their gods as powers determining the totality of reality/^ 
the competition can essentially be seen as different ideas of God competing to see 
which one can best correspond to the given reality. The idea of God presented here, 
according to Pannenberg, does not necessarily refer to a personal character. To put it 
impersonally, it can be conceived as “a mysterious ground of all reality transcending 
one's own and all other finite existence". ^ ^ Therefore the reality of God or divine 
power of such kind can only be proved by its happening (Widerfahrnis) within the 
horizon of current experience of existence.如 
However, the point which Pannenberg cannot agree with ordinary 
phenomenological method is its static presupposition of human behaviour. Therefore 
the reference to the reality cannot be limited only to particular points in history, it 
must be seen against every new stage of history. Thus the idea of God must appear as 
the "all-embracing, infinite mystery”，and time becomes the condition and measure of 
the appearance of this infinite in the finite 21 Understood in this way, the history of 
religions is: 
The history of the appearing of the divine mystery presupposed in the 
structure of human existence, whose reality and peculiar character, 
however, are themselves at stake in the process of this history?^ 
Consequently, for a "theology of the history of religions", its concern must be the 
reality of God (or gods) within this h is tory. 
We may find another similarity if we compare this hermeneutical circle with 
that we come across before. In the last chapter when Pannenberg is searching for a 
unity of history, he tries to establish it by appealing to human understanding process, 
16 Ibid., p.95. 
17 Ibid., p.97. 
18 Ibid., pp.95-96. 
19 Ibid., p. 102. 
20 Ibid., p. 104. 
21 Ibid., p. 106. 
22 Ibid., p. 112. 
23 Ibid. 
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deriving from it that a universal history is needed. Therefore meanings of particular 
events in history can be ever re-evaluated against this projected horizon. Now when a 
unity of history of religions is what we needed, Pannenberg appeals to the general 
phenomenon that syncretism is always a tendency in religious histories. But the 
ultimate unity can only be found at the end. Therefore if we want to look for the 
peculiarity of particular religion, then we must see it against this history of religions 
as a universal background. However when he deals with the issue of the "reference to 
the reality", obviously Pannenberg has made an assumption that human being must 
presuppose something greater than himself as the controlling power of this world. 
This he names as God, or in more abstract term, the mystery of reality. Pannenberg 
does not deny that the anthropological concept he offers is "religious a priori”, and he 
tries to defend it by revisiting different theories from Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, 
and even his contemporary Max Scheler.^^ This may perhaps explain partly why 
Pannenberg would prepare such a large volume of Anthropology in Theological 
Perspective^^ and other articles concerning similar question in the 70s, even the small 
book What is Man? appeared as early in 1962. 
At last we come to the important point: in what way then Christianity is so 
peculiar in the history of religions? Pannenberg thinks that its peculiarity is first 
already reflected in the religion of Israel. He says: 
In contradistinction to other peoples and their religions, Israel, in the light 
of its particular experience of God, learned to understand the reality of 
human existence as a history moving toward a goal which had not yet 
appeared.27 
This experience is particular in the way that “the God of the future salvation is already 
powerful in the present"?^ Nevertheless the people of Israel continued to seek the 
revelation of God from their past. It is the message of Jesus that brought about a 
decisive change. Though Jesus still talked about the God of Israel, the one he referred 
24 Ibid.，pp.97-103. 
25 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, Matthew J. O'Connell trans. 
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1985) [German ed., 1983], 
26 Wolfhart Pannenberg, What is Man?, Duane A. Priebe trans. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970) [German 
ed., 1962]. 




to is not bounded by the Israelite traditions. He is the God of the coming kingdom. 
This point is important in the way that: 
As the power to be conceived from the standpoint of its futurity, from the 
side of its future coming, he can no longer be superseded by any other 
future or any new experience of God, but instead new happenings of the 
divine mystery will be only further manifestations of himself in new forms 
of appearance， 
So to say, the divine mystery thus proclaimed is inexhaustible. Jesus as the finite 
revealer of this infinite God does also no harm to this principle, because he carried out 
the mission of the infinite God unto death. Not only unto death, but through the 
resurrection he broke away the fmitization of the infinite God. Therefore it is said 
that through his fate the end of all events is already anticipated.^^ So Pannenberg can 
conclude his presentation, says: 
As the power of the future, the God of the coming reign of God proclaimed 
by Jesus already anticipates all later epochs of the history of the church and 
of the non-Christian religions. From this standpoint, the history of 
religions even beyond the time of the public ministry of Jesus presents 
itself as a history of the appearance of the God who revealed himself 
t h r o u g h Jesus.32 
Since to Pannenberg Christianity is so particular and reveals the God of futurity, even 
“the description of the non-Christian religions must then be developed as if seen 
through Christian g lasses” . 
^ ^ 
An Assessment 
III the above presen ta t ion of P a n n e n b e r g ' s v i ew on the his tory of re l ig ions , we 
have a l ready g iven due c o m m e n t s lo s h o w that, he is ac tual ly m a k i n g use of a s imi lar 
f r a m e w o r k lo suppor t his op in ion on the subjec t , as he docs in dea l ing with the 
Ibid., pp.113-114. 
；'ibid..p. 114. 
•‘ Ibid., pp.114-115； sec also RaH. thesis 4. 
TTHoR. p. 115. 
• Ibid . p. 117. 
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resurrection event. If he treats the two questions in parallel, then we may also offer 
similar assessment from the same line of thought. 
First of all, we must give honour to Pannenberg for offering such a 
sophisticated framework to deal with the grand problem of history of religions. The 
framework is not an arbitrary creation, but it is started by the zeal to cure the 
subject!vist trend of contemporary theology. Therefore no matter Pannenberg is 
dealing with the resurrection event or uniqueness of Christianity, he tries first to have 
dialogue with some so-called "critical" or "scientific" methodologies. Certainly his 
special talent is reflected in the processes of discovering the hidden presuppositions in 
both historical method and phenomenological method, nevertheless Pannenberg can 
in no way create a presuppositionless system. As we have seen before the 
hermeneutical circle he set for evaluating resurrection is a carefully formulated one, in 
the sense that God is supposed to be the historical process, exerting his power from 
the future to present time. Similar idea can be found in his interpretation of the 
history of religions. We are called to grant credit to the peculiarities of individual 
religious phenomenon while these peculiarities can only be seen against a unified 
history of religions. But the basis of this unity as well as the reference of peculiarity 
both depend on the idea of God, who can be termed as the infinite mystery of reality. 
However this kind of conception as a whole clearly emerged from a generalization of 
the ancient near East and then Judeo-Christian religious history. Eventually the 
peculiarity or uniqueness of Christianity is measured by the standard whether the 
message of Jesus and the implication of resurrection conform to this idea of God, who 
is the all-determining power of the future. Since Pannenberg has just evaluated the 
success of a religion against its own religio-historical background, it is quite a natural 
result to have this peculiarity perceived. But the question is why this result is also 
meaningful to people living in other time and place without the same religio-cultural 
tradition? Is it not exactly the reason Pannenberg dealt with the history of religions? 
The success of Christianity in the region of Middle East and Europe does not rule out 
the same success of other religions with respect to their religio-cultural backgrounds. 
To make the game fairer and more reasonable, I think Pannenberg at least should pay 
more attention to other individual religions to see if they can also fiilfill the same task, 
and in addition if his measuring standard is really a sound premise. 
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Perhaps in fact anyone of us cannot state a word or two entirely without 
presupposition. A Christian theologian cannot be an exception. Looking in this way, 
the problem of this interpretation is not simply presupposing an anthropology which is 
"religious a priori,,. As we have seen, Pannenberg admits this point. Whether his 
anthropology sounds or not is beyond the scope of our discussion. As Pannenberg is a 
western theologian living in the west, John B. Cobb recognized that in the above 
presentation his definition of God is a generalization from western religious tradition. 
Therefore it is easy for him to find that Christianity exhibits peculiarity under this 
standard. 34 However, is Pannenberg's definition of God as “the all-determining 
reality，，an adequate one for all people at all time and place? As Gary Bollinger points 
out, Buddhism is already an example demonstrating what human being seeks in a 
religion may not be the idea of God as Pannenberg suggests, but the very contrary, 
Emptiness. It may be as Cobb has suggested, a genuine encounter with the oriental 
religions would both enrich and complicate Pannenberg's p r o g r a m . 
From the discussion so far we have seen that Pannenberg has essentially 
ascribed to God the title of all-determining power from the future and the infinite 
mystery of reality. The consequence is that God has bore the whole responsibility to 
the future of history. This, of course, may easily lead to a cold determinism,but as 
an easterner I find the most dangerous point of Pannenberg's thought on the 
discussion of a theology of the history of religions is that it can easily lead to an 
"intellectual imperialism". ^^  According to Pannenberg's opinion, once different 
religions encounter, they must compete with each other. The stronger will remain and 
assimilates the elements of its opponents, finally they are rid off. My question is: 
even though a monotheistic faith is presupposed, a final victory of the one God is 
anticipated, and all the previous religious history shows a syncretistic trend, does it 
necessarily follow that only one single religion must be found at the end of history? 
Has Pannenberg presupposed and interpreted too much on this point such that when 
John B. Cobb Jr. in "Review of Theology and the Philosophy of Science'', Religious Studies Review 
3(1977), p.214. 
Gary Bollinger, "Pannenberg's Theology of the Religions and the Claim to Christian Superiority" 
Encounter 43(1982), pp.273-285. ， 
% John B.Cobb, p.214. 
“ F o r this aspect, see David Polk, "The All-determining God and the Peril of Determinism", Carl E. 
Braaten & Philip Clayton ed., The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, pp. 152-168. ， 
J A term adopted from John B. Cobb Jr., p.214. 
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he requests others to pay attention to the contingencies in history, it is he himself who 
misses the point when he anticipates the eschatological scenario from the past history? 
We may enumerate more points big and small to criticize the program 
Pannenberg has built up. However, even in this early stage, though it is fragmentary, 
no one can deny that his thought is highly "constructive". It is constructive in the 
sense that most aspects of traditional theological doctrines, if not all, are mentioned, 
and even are linked to form a complex whole. It is a special gift of the German 
theologian. In the next chapter we shall go on to see how the systematic engineer 
I rearrange this complex whole to a more presentable and readable form in 
Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie. It eventually becomes the blue print for his 








Theology as a Science of Religion 
In Chapter 3 we have seen that truth has gradually become a main theme in 
Pannenberg's theological program. In fact, as early in 1963, when Pannenberg talks 
about "The Crisis of the Scripture Principle’？ he says: 
Systematic theology always takes place within the tension between two 
tendencies. On the one hand, it is concerned about the faithfulness of 
theology itself (and, beyond this, of the Christian church) to its origin, the 
revelation of God in Jesus Christ as this is attested in Scripture. On the 
other hand, however, the task of theology goes beyond its special theme 
and includes all truth whatever. This universality of theology is unavoidably 
bound up with the fact that it speaks of God.� 
Since God as Pannenberg defined is "the power that determines everything that 
exists，，,3 "a mysterious ground of all reality transcending one's own and all other finite 
existence",斗 the "all-embracing, infinite mystery", ^ and the like, who should be 
capable of being experienced in any realm, thus Pannenberg cannot let theology fall 
back to an epistemologically isolated revelationist position.^ In this way, anything we 
regard as "true" must have some bearing on revelation, if God the creator complies 
the connotations above.? Therefore for the sake of intellectual integrity, theology can 
have no privileged position in the pursuit of truth. It is part of the reason Pannenberg 
felt the obligation to encounter with other disciplines, especially the philosophy of 
‘Wolfhart Pannenberg, "The Crisis of the Scripture Principle", Basic Questions in Theology Vol 1 
pp.1-14. , 
“Ibid., p . l ; italics mine. 
3 Ibid. 
^ TTHoR, p.102. 
^ Ibid., p. 106. 
6 Wentzel van Huyssteen, Theology and the Justification of Faith, H. F. Snijders trans. (Grand 
Rapids:Eerdmans, 1989), p.75. 
7 Interesting is that the only article Pannenberg contributed to East Asia Journal of Theology is titled as 
"The Doctrine of Creation and Modem Science", vol. 4:1 (1986). Did he intend to have dialogue with 
the oriental people by the "all-embracing" doctrine he perceives? 
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science.^ The gigantic work Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie published in 1973 is 
until today one of the most discussed publication in this aspect. In this chapter we 
shall see how Pannenberg deals with the issue, and more important, how he constructs 
theology as a university discipline under this light. However as the main theme of our 
essay is not to deal with the scientific status of theology, we can only offer a very brief 
outline of the first part of Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie as a background of our 
enquiry. Readers who are interested in the topic should consult Pannenberg's original 
work. The following will focus mainly on how Pannenberg perceives theology as a 
science of God and religion after the dialogue with the philosophy of science. Later 
on，we shall discover that the agenda he set in the work has become the compass for 
his Systematische Theologie. 
The Scientific Status of Theology as a Question 
Pannenberg thinks that nowadays institutions of higher education can no 
longer uphold the medieval view of the system of sciences {Wissenschaft)^ In this 
way every university discipline should undergo a transformation to establish its own 
scientific status. Theology cannot be an exception to remain in its status quo. Instead 
it must also as all other disciplines begin a renewal to examine its scientific character. 
To deal with the problem, Pannenberg thinks that theology must encounter with the 
philosophy of science, especially that of logical positivism and critical rationalism/^ 
Realizing the impasse of applying logical positivism to theology, Pannenberg 
appropriate Karl Popper's attack of the one-sidedness of the positivist verifiability 
criterion, and gives the falsifiability of theories a central place to his model of the 
philosophy of science, n To tackle the problem, Pannenberg follows Popper's view 
that inductive reasoning and the principle of verification cannot offer any answer to 
the question of scientific knowledge. It is because a general rule is always applied to 
an infinite number of instances, but only a limited of them can be known at any given 
8 Another important reason is to justify theology as a university discipline; see Wolfhart Pannenberg 
Theology and the Philosophy of Science, Francis McDonagh trans. (London: Darton, Longman & T^odd 
1976), pp.3-7; hereafter abbreviated as TaPS. , 
9 Wissenschaft in German does not only refer to the narrow sense of natural sciences, but also include 




time，thus generalization can never claim absolute certainty. Therefore the objective 
criteria of the scientific thought rely actually on the testability of propositions on an 
intersubjective level. Objectivity is a social matter, a characteristic of a certain group. 
In this way, scientific statements are thus ultimately founded on worldviews of a 
1 'J   
philosophical and/or religious nature. Appropriating Thomas S. Kuhn's term, the 
difference among various disciplines is that they perceive things according to each 
one's own "paradigm". Van Huyssteen accurately points out that though Pannenberg 
seems to follow Popper's theory quite closely, eventually it is Kuhn's paradigm theory 
which has guided Pannenberg in the later phase of this scientific enquiry of 
1 o 
theology. However Kuhn's concept of "paradigm articulation" declares that a 
scientist is always involved not only in the context of discovery, but also in that of 
justification. 14 Therefore, as van Huyssteen figures out, the central question of 
Pannenberg becomes: 
How does he [Pannenberg] justify his view of the role of the theologian's 
personal religious commitment in the process of theorizing in theology, 
and his definition of truth and objectivity in theology and science?^^ 
Ultimately it is crucial to evaluate Pannenberg's view of theology with respect to his 
relationship with Popper's critical rationalism and Kuhn's paradigm theory. ^^  We 
shall look more closely into the issue shortly after. 
After tackling with logical positivism and critical rationalism, Pannenberg 
then discusses on the emancipation of the human sciences from the natural sciences, 
and even offers a critique on the division of the two.^^ Apczynski's view is correct, 
the discussion as portrayed above must lead to an expanded notion of science, such 
that the methodology of the human sciences is not radically discontinuous from that of 
natural science. ^^  Pannenberg eventually ends his dialogue with philosophy of 
science by a chapter on hermeneutic. He seems to propose an interpretation of 
12 Ibid., pp.52-56; see also J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology (Grand 
Rapids, Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1997), pp.58-59. 
13 Van Huyssteen, Essays, p.57; van Huyssteen, Theology, p.77. 
14 TaPS, pp.56-58; see also van Huyssteen, Essays, p.59. 
Van Huyssteen, Essays, p.58, van Huyssteen, Theology, p.78. 
16 Van Huyssteen, Essays, p.57; van Huyssteen, Theology, p.77. 
17 TaPS, Part One, Chapter 2. 
18 John V. Apczynski, "Truth in Religion: A Polanyian Appraisal of Wolfhart Pannenberg's Theological 
Program", Zygon 17(1982), p.53. 
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hermeneutic as the philosophical framework for understanding all meaning, thus a 
unitary view of knowledge is provided/^ 
In brief, Pannenberg thinks that theology must adopt a model of science, on 
the one hand whose claims can be falsified, and on the other the involvement of the 
theorizing theologians can be justified. It is the reason Pannenberg cannot follow 
Barth to regard Jesus Christ as a pre-established datum in theological theorizing, since 
in this way theology can only be regarded as the "true dogma" or "proper doctrine" of 
a church and is ceased to be a science?^ Then the first question Pannenberg has to 
encounter is what specific subject making up the essential area of theological inquiry, 
and how individual theological disciplines make up the necessary parts of theology, 
such that theology can satisfy his model of science.^^ 
/-s^  /-N^  
Theology as a Science of God 
Following the above logic, the next question Pannenberg has to deal with is 
whether theology has really got an overarching object, which can introduce the 
testability of theological assertions into the system. Pannenberg grants an affirmative 
answer to the question. He thinks that the unity of theology derives neither from its 
methodology nor practical connection external to its objects, but theology is theology 
because it is a science of God. The extension of "objects" theology seems to cover 
because all of them have their relation to God {sub ratione Dei).^^ Therefore God can 
be justified as the object of theology within the context of this discussion. 
However, to regard God as the true object of theology, Pannenberg perceives 
that two problems would immediately arise. Firstly, the idea of "God" itself is 
explained by other data; and secondly, it is measured and verified on its own 
implications but not the concept itself. Therefore "God is the object of theology only 
as a problem, not as established fact."^^ Since God is not present to human being as 
19 Ibid., p.55. 
20 TaPS, pp.271-276; see also van Huyssteen, Essays, p.61. 
TaPS，P.6; Pannenberg raises this question in the very beginning of the book, and this can be seen as 
the central issue of this publication. 
22 Ibid., p.298. 
23 Ibid., pp.299-300. 
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one object among others, Pannenberg baldly declares that a science of God is only 
possible on the assumption that: 
The reality of God is co-given to experience in other objects, that it is 
therefore accessible to theological reflection not directly but only 
indirectly.24 
Moreover, according to Pannenberg's definition of God as the "all-determining 
reality", all objects should be regarded as medium through which one may have the 
experience of God. 25 This premise if seen against his former publications, echoes 
well with his dogmatic theses in Offenbarung als Geschichte. In which Pannenberg 
also declares that the revelation of God can only be experienced indirectly in history. 
Therefore the entire reality would be the scene for perceiving God. 
However, what we can directly experience is only the finite reality. But God 
as the all-determining reality requires us to grasp the totality of reality, which is not 
available to our experience still, in order to experience him completely. At this point 
Pannenberg again makes use of the hermeneutical concept anticipation to solve the 
knot. That is to say, the significances of individual events are only perceived within 
the context of a totality of significance. Nevertheless this totality of reality does not 
exist anywhere, but is only projected by our subjective conjecture, i.e. anticipation?^ 
Thus if God is the all-determining reality, then: 
The reality of God is always present only in subjective anticipations of the totality 
of reality, in models of the totality of meaning presupposed in all particular 
experience. These models, however, are historic, which means that they are subject 
to confirmation or refutation by subsequent experience. 
Pannenberg unequivocally admits that the reality of God is only experienced in our 
anticipation, which implies that it is always a hypothesis. But in this way, the 
criterion of falsifiability of his model of science is satisfied. However, if theological 
assertions can only be examined from the subjective conjecture of human experience, 
then it may easily fall back to the fideistic revelationist position which he has 
repeatedly criticized. So Pannenberg goes on to clarify that, this falsifying process is 
not something merely subjective but possesses a historical character. 
24 Ibid.,p.301. 
25 Ibid., p.302. 
26 Ibid., pp.309-310. 
27 Ibid.,p.310. 
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Pannenberg points out that though the particular experience of the reality as a 
whole must be subjective, it is at the same time also experienced historically 
28 
{geschichtlich). Adopting T. Luckmann's view of sociology of religion, to 
Pannenberg, articulating an understanding of the reality as a whole from historical 
experience is already a religious phenomenon, no matter whether the idea of God or 
gods is mentioned. And since the idea of the reality often provides a basis for the 
order of a society, individual experience is always related to a socially organized 
29 
religion. More important is that, only within a context of a certain community can 
individual experiences acquire the status of intersubjectively valid truth, therefore 
Pannenberg thinks that “it is the historical religions rather than individual religious 
experiences alone which must be regarded as the expression of the experience of 
divine reality within the totality of meaning of experienced reality." ^^  Thus a 
subjective fideistic position seems to be avoided. 
Up to this point I think it is worthy to hear Pannenberg's own conclusion of his 
discussion: 
What must we conclude from this discussion about the possibility of 
theology as a science of God? We started from the premise that theology 
as a science of God is possible only indirectly, in relation to reality as a 
whole. However, reality as a whole does not exist as a finished constituent 
of a cosmos but is part of a still unfinished process and is accessible as a 
whole only in the subjectivity of human experience in the form of an 
anticipated totality of meaning. In religious experience this becomes 
explicit as the revelation of divine reality, and the individuaFs religious 
experience is always in some way or other connected with the historical 
religions and derives its inter subjective relevance entirely form this 
connection. Theology as a science of God is therefore possible only as a 
science of religion, and not as the science of religion in general but of the 
historic religions.^ ^  
One of the most significant points to systematic theology in this discussion is that, I 
think, theology as a science of God is eventually done by treating it as a science of 
historic religions. As Pannenberg himself spells out, "we can know of divine 
28 Ibid. ,p .3l l . 




revelation only through... the mediation of the religious form of human experience of 
revelation. This has the important implication, however, that it is impossible to look 
at divine revelation in advance on its own, in some way before all human religion, and 
compare it with religion. ”32 It is because though the divine revelation can be obtained 
from individuals directly, it must acquire intersubjective level of validity; otherwise it 
would become a fideistic revelationist claim. If a verifying process is required, then 
submitting to an intersubjective check is a must. The historic religions are the 
already-made models for such purpose. Consequently, divine revelation can said to 
be manifested through religious traditions. Any route intended to skip the religious 
tradition must be rendered as unscientific. 
Following this line of thought, a scientific study of historic religions must 
acquire an important role in theological study. Christianity, under this agenda, should 
also be put side by side with other historic religions. As Pannenberg says: 
The importance of a single religion and its particular stage of development 
can be fully seen only within the framework of a history of world religions. 
The sciences of religion therefore form the appropriate framework for the 
practice of Christian theology and all its disciplines.^^ 
In this way as Christianity is ranged together with other historic religions, it seems 
that a partiality favoured Christianity can be avoided; the imperialist and colonialist 
obsession inherited in Christian theology can also be rid off.34 A framework of a 
theology of history of religions with methodology is proposed. In the period of the 
60，s, though Pannenberg has published quite a lot of literature and established his 
position in the area of systematic theology, it is difficult to find a clear pivotal point to 
link up his various insights. Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie under this light is the 
first piece of work in which Pannenberg elaborates his framework oftheology^^ with a 
clear concern holistically, and it should be regarded as advancement to his previous 
theological program. 
32 Ibid.,p.319. 
“TaPS , P.361. 
M Ibid., pp.360-361. 
' 'Readers who are interested in how Pannenberg organizes different theological disciplines into a 
whole should consult TaPS Part II，Chapter 6, "The Internal Organization of Theology". 
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Old Problem in New Formulation 
Readers may have already realized that, theology formulated by this scheme, 
though its assertions can be falsified, the judgment or justification process is also 
made by those who have religious commitment. Thus theological statements can only 
claim of an "intersubjective validity". In this way, can theology as a science of God 
attain a status of universal truth? Pannenberg offers at this point a highly 
controversial solution: the theologian's private religious affiliation belongs only to the 
q A 
heuristic, but not the probative, context of theological statements. Pannenberg 
seems to suggest that, though a theologian or a religious tradition provides a heuristic 
system to explain the conjecture of the whole reality, it is still at most a hypothesis but 
not a solution. Whether the hypothesis sounds or not must be seen against its 
capability to integrate the totality of currently available experience. Taking the term 
Pannenberg used in "Toward a theology of the History of Religions", the justification 
o o 
is done with reference to the reality (Wirklichkeitshezug). Finally, the theologians 
can claim to be involved in theorizing theology without committing to the system, and 
the process satisfies Hartley's “people can be engaged without being committed' 
requirement.^^ 
In the beginning of the chapter, we have already stated in brief the question 
perceived by Pannenberg as: 
Theology must adopt a model of science, on the one hand whose claims 
can be falsified, and on the other the involvement of the theorizing 
theologians can be justified. 
For the first part of the question, Pannenberg tackled perfectly by making the idea of 
God in historical religions as hypothesis to be tested. But we may hesitate to embrace 
the solution he offers for the second part. Aiming at avoiding the label of fideistic 
revelationist, Pannenberg seems to remain caught up in the demand for a 
noncommitment in the evaluation of theories in the context of justification. But he is 
well aware that anyone approaches theology, like all other sciences, not without 
36 Ibid., P.321. 
37 Ibid., p.322. 
TTHoR, p.97. 
39 w. W. Hartley, The Retreat to Commitment (London: Chatto and Windus, 1964), p.215f. 
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presuppositions or values, as tabula rasa!^^ Therefore finally the crucial question is 
whether the presupposition is really open for test. 
We have mentioned above that the method Pannenberg employs to justify his 
claim is appealing to the reference of reality. The intention is obvious: to make 
theology comparable to empirical science, thus fulfilling the requirement he set. 
However, the hypothesis to be tested is formulated by anticipating the totality of 
reality from the present available finite reality. However he himself also perceives 
that: 
The peculiar difficulty of making a final judgment in the case of 
philosophical and theological statements arises from the fact that such 
statements have to do with reality as a whole, and not just with its general 
structural features, but with the totality of its temporal process. Because of 
this a final judgment is impossible for someone who stands within this still 
open process, and not at its end.4i 
So Pannenberg admits that the final verdict can only be settled in the eschatological 
fUture.42 However, there exists an eschatological future, God does exist as the all-
determining reality and object of faith, are not all these the presuppositions and values 
the believing theologians bring along with into the theorizing and justifying processes? 
I think that the fatal error Pannenberg has committed is that he has wrongly 
regarded the finite reality as neutral data for verifying any given paradigms. 
Therefore he has tried hard to criticize Gadamer's hermeneutic of failing to grant 
legitimacy of objectification in statements,43 in order to justify an empirical checking 
process by the reality. However, brute facts do not speak. As we have seen before, as 
early in Offenharung als Geschichte Pannenberg has already been aware that, 
“History is not composed of raw or so-called brute facts... history is also the history 
of transmission of history.”々 斗 In Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie the historical 
religious traditions he refers to, are also derived from human historical (geschichtlich) 
experiences. That means, no matter it is history or reality, we can approach them only 
with our interpretation. Reality as neutral data is only a naive postulation. 
Apczynski's has a good comment: 
40 Ibid., p.320. 
4ilbid.,p.343. 
42 Ibid. 
TaPS, p. 136; similar critique is also found in HaUH, pp. 123-124 
44RaH’p.l52. . 
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Even though he [Pannenberg] tries to formulate this in impersonal terms, 
through techniques such as theorectical models of systems of meaning, he 
still presupposes knowing subjects who experience reality in terms of 
such theoretical constructs."^^ 
In fact, when Pannenberg makes use of the concept anticipation, it reveals that Hans-
Georg Gadamer's hermeneutical framework still plays an important role in his 
theological system. According to this framework, human pre-understanding is 
unavoidable in any interpretive process. Of course, it must include the perception of 
the finite reality within the justifying process in Pannenberg's system. Then what is 
the ultimate unalterable premise or pre-understanding in this model of theology? 
Obviously and Pannenberg himself has admitted frankly, that God is the all-
determining reality must be taken as a minimal pre-requite/^ Therefore even there is 
any temporal falsification to the theological statements, there can only be minor 
correction to the hypothesis built upon this ultimate premise, which can never be 
falsified unless at the eschaton. But how about if there will be no eschaton at all? 
Eventually it is forced to conclude that the premise of the program exhibits only 
verifiability but not falsifiability. Wrapping it into the clothes of philosophy of 
science, the problem exactly is what van Huyssteen says: 
Two clear lines remain irreconcilable in Pannenberg's thought: on the one 
hand, the [Popper's] critical-rationalistic demand for an uncommitted, 
areligious, and objective context of justification for theology; and, on the 
other, Kuhn's conviction that the so-called objectively scientific criteria are 
paradigmatically determined and as such rooted in the researcher's 
sociocultural context... he failed to face the crucial question of the 
theologians personal commitment and the theorizing implicit in it 4? 
However, if a Christian theologian cannot act as if he were not, then it is just 
natural that a Christian theologian perceiving his own religion and others from his 
own interpreted Christian perspective. At least in this scheme Pannenberg has 
demonstrated that theology can be treated as a scientific discipline getting a certain 
degree of testability, but not built solely on an epistemologically isolated revelationist 
ground. More important, Pannenberg is willing to integrate religious studies, 
Apczynski, "Truth", p.63. 
46 TaPS, p.302. 
Van Huyssteen, Theology, p.98. 
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especially the study of historic religions, into a Christian theological framework, not 
only abstractly criticizing religions from some preset dogmatic positions. But in 
execution of this proposal with his minimal pre-requite of the concept of God and 
teleological view of history, it seems that a partiality for Christianity may exist. In the 





A Systematic Gestalt 
Prior to the appearance in print of Pannenberg's projected dogmatics, 
discussions of his doctrinal formulations are somewhat premature. 
Although his writings to date have touched on certain aspects of 
systematic theology, his statements do not constitute a delineation of his 
full understanding of Christian doctrine. Foundational to Pannenberg's 
thought, however, are several interrelated theological propositions, 
including the following: God is defined as the power that determines 
everything. The human person is seen as a naturally religious being. The 
focal point of God's self-revelation is the historical process. Although 
God's self-disclosure is found at the end of history, it is proleptically 
present in Jesus' resurrection. These (and all) theological statements are 
not known merely by an act of faith apart from the explorations of reason, 
but rather are subject to critical inquiry.^ 
Stanley J. Grenz wrote these words just after Pannenberg's first volume of his 
Systematische Theologie appeared in 1988. I think it is both a very good summary 
and comment to Pannenberg's theological enterprise developed so far. Nearly 30 
years after Offenbaurung als Geschichte was published, the German theological 
giant's systematic Gestalt finally comes up. Many have long been waiting for this 
volume and are anxious to see what Pannenberg would build upon such an impressive 
foundation. However, after their first reading, quite a large portion has expressed 
their disappointment. To quote two of the most common comments, William C. 
Placher says: 
Reading Pannenberg, one admires his erudition and one learns from his 
insights. This volume contains plenty of both. But he seems to live in a 
world where some significant paradigms can be assumed: a world where 
Western tradition as a whole remains essentially unproblematic, where 
1 Stanley J. Grenz, "The Appraisal of Pannenberg: A Survey of the Literature", Carl E. Braaten & 
Philip Clayton ed., The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg (Minneapolis: Ausburg, 1988), p.31. 
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people generally seem to know what counts as a reasoned argument, and 
where theologians know what counts as "the theological tradition"? 
Brian J. Walsh makes even stronger words in the introduction of a symposium 
dedicated to this volume saying: 
We will be disappointed not primarily because Pannenberg has failed to 
meet either our agenda of historically grounding Christian faith in the 
events of the gospels, or any particular agenda for socio-political witness, 
but because Pannenberg has attempted to write a contextless theology. In 
the Forward to this volume he says, "... This presentation does not deal 
with a Lutheran or even a European (as opposed, e.g., to Latin American) 
theology, but simply the truth of Christian doctrine and the Christian 
confession." (p. xiii) "Simply the truth!" Too many of us have come to 
believe that the truth must be contextual in order to be known and lived, 
for us to feel very comfortable with this proclamation.^ 
Criticisms as these are not few, therefore in the following we shall on the one hand try 
to see how Pannenberg integrate his theological program, with special concentration 
on the issue of the encounter of different religions, and on the other hand whether 
these comments are relevant. 
/"•s^  /-s^  /"Nifc/ 
The Quest of Truth as the Task of Systematic Theology 
Perhaps the first question we may want to know from Pannenberg is: what 
does he understand by the term “systematic theology"? In the "Forward" of the book 
Pannenberg has already offered his answer: 
A general presentation of Christian doctrine often goes under the title 
"systematic theology" because the author wishes to avoid the term 
"dogmatics". Such is not the case here. In this context the title must be 
2 William C. Placher, "Revealed to Reason: Theology as 'Normal Science'", Christian Century 109 
(1992), p.195. 
)Brian J. Walsh, Introduction to "Pannenberg's Systematic Theology, Vol. I: A Symposium" Calvin 
Theological Journal 27 (1997), p.306. ， 
52 
taken quite literally. We shall be expressing the subject matter of 
dogmatics in all its variety as the unfolding of the Christian idea of God.^ 
Pannenberg is well aware that this definition brings to him a subtle challenge, since 
Christian doctrine is from first to last a historical construct while it is believed that the 
content rests on the historical revelation of God in the historical figure of Jesus 
Christ. 5 Therefore one of his main tasks must be to show that the Christian doctrine 
as theology is founded by the divine revelation. 
As divine revelation is possible only from God, it seems that God should be 
viewed as the single, all-embracing object of theology. But from our common 
understanding we know that the Christian doctrine includes many things distinct from 
God, thus Pannenberg suggests it is better to regard "God is the unifying point of 
reference for all the objects and themes of theology, and in this sense he is its absolute 
subject". 6 This idea agrees with that developed in Wissenschaftstheorie und 
Theologie, so Pannenberg knows very well that he cannot just take the theme sub 
ratione Dei as merely a presupposition, theological discourse must prove itself to be 
more than human talk. Therefore explicitly he tells us that: 
The truth question was now part of the task of hermeneutics. This might 
have meant that in investigating and presenting Christian doctrine the 
answer to the question of its truth as God's revelation would no longer be 
treated as the presupposition of the task but as its goal.? 
Moreover, as the days when the scripture is viewed as the verbal inspiration of God 
have gone, and modern historico-critical exegesis shows that the biblical writings are 
basically documents of a past era, Pannenberg perceives that "thus the weight of the 
question as to the truth of talk about God has shifted over entirely to dogmatics".^ 
This is the reason why the truth of Christian doctrine becomes prominent in this 
volume of Systematische Theologie. 
However, if we agree that God should be the sole subject of revelation, then 
also God alone would have the competence to speak the final word for the content and 
the truth of theology at the end of history. This raises the question of the possibility of 
present knowledge about him. Pannenberg thinks that "this does not mean that 
4 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol. 1, Geoffrey W. Bromiley trans. (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1991), p.x; hereafter abbreviated as STl. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., P.5. 
7 Ibid., P.36. 
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present knowledge of the content is impossible, given the premise that God makes it 
possible for us to know him through his work in history".^ But he does admit that 
such kind of knowledge is only provisional, that means "the dogmatic formulas of the 
church and the formulations of theology must be continually put to the test". ^^  
However this process is itself obviously an interpretation of dogma, therefore it must 
give rise to the question of the relative nature of theology. To solve the dilemma, 
Pannenberg again makes use of his favourite concept - anticipation. He says: 
The limits that are posed with the historicity of human experience apply 
especially to experience of God because God is never an identifiable object 
in the world that we all inhibit, and his reality is bound up with and 
indeed over the totality of the world in its history. This does not rule out 
the possibility of provisional experiences of the reality of God and his 
faithfulness in the course of history, but all the statements that we make 
about these, in the specific mode of all human talk about God, rest on 
anticipations of the totality of the world and therefore on the as yet 
nonexistent future of its uncompleted history. The historicity of human 
experience and reflection forms the most important limit of our human 
knowledge of God. Solely on account of its historicity all human talk 
about God unavoidably falls short of full and final knowledge of the truth 
of God. 11 
Pannenberg baldly admits that our present knowledge of Christian theology is only 
partial compared with the definitive revelation of God in the future of his kingdom, 
thus our talk of God is only a doxology and the statements of dogmatics and the 
theses of the Christian doctrine are only hypotheses. ^ ^ But it does no harm to the 
status of theology since it can also have the form of systematic reflection. Moreover, 
our anticipation to the future rests on the prolepsis of the eschaton in the fate of Jesus 
Christ. 13 Therefore the revelation of Jesus Christ carries a very crucial role in this 
truth-seeking process, as in his early literatures. We shall come back to this point later. 
8 Ibid., P.8. 
' l b id . ,p . l6 . 
leibid. 
11 Ibid., p.55-56. 
12 Ibid. 
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/ • ' ^ / / " V , ^ 
The Reality of God and the Experience of Religions 
Now we shall turn to another problem: if the Christian proclamation must 
continuously be put to test, then how to evaluate its truth-claim? The oldest criterion 
for this contest is by "consensus". However Pannenberg points out that merely 
consensus is not sufficient for verifying truth-claim because consensus only holds for 
a particular group for a given time and space. Their conviction may involve also 
collective misunderstanding or prejudice, Therefore additional standard is required. 
To Pannenberg "coherence" plays another important role. He thinks that if truth is 
essentially unique, then explication about this truth should not be self-contradictory. 
“To this extent a systematic presentation of the articles of faith directly involves their 
truth and the ascertainment of their truth." ^^  Besides consensus and coherence, 
Pannenberg thinks that truth-claim must also be tested against its "correspondence", 
that means it can be verified through our worldly experience. ^^  This point is 
particularly important, as we are living in a religiously pluralistic world, different 
deities and truth-claims exist side by side with each other. Therefore some basic 
criteria ought to be listed out for the test under this condition. 
Pannenberg thinks that human reason must assume a world-transcendent cause 
or origin in order to satisfy the question of foundation of world's unity. ^ ^ In this there 
is no difference between Christian and non-Christian, thus he upholds that human 
being has a natural knowledge of God.^^ Following Rene Descartes' Third Meditation, 
Pannenberg describes this innate knowledge of God as an unthematic intuition of the 
infinite, which provides the necessary condition of the apprehension of finite 
objects. 19 But this "nonthematic awareness of the infinite" can become thematically 
conscious through the mediation of religions?® Therefore if we do not want to remain 
only in a Christian perspective to tackle with the issue, it is necessary for us to explore 
other religious traditions. 
13 Ibid., p.56. 
丨4 Ibid.,pp.ll-13. 
”Ibid., p. 19. 
16 Ibid., pp.23-24. 
17 Ibid., P.94; See also Steffen Losel, "Wolfhart Pannenberg's Response to the Challenge of Religious 
Pkiralism: The Anticipation of Divine Absoluteness?", Journal of Ecumenical Studies 34 (1997), p.502. 
STl, pp.107-108. ‘ ‘ 
Ibid.,p.l l3. 
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However it is quite obvious from the above foundation that different religions, 
to Pannenberg, should have a common orientation toward the same divine reality.^^ 
Thus Pannenberg admits clearly that “ a view of this kind presupposes, of course, the 
standpoint of that monotheistic religions.,,22 On this basis, then different religions 
provide different models of deity to explain the world people experienced. So in the 
development of the history of religions we can find one deity is always in conflict 
with others, competing with one and other for spheres of influence. Pannenberg 
thinks it is especially true for the God of Israel.^^ Hence in due course, some less 
competitive religions will fade out from the stage and stronger will remain. 
Eventually, Pannenberg predicts a "final battle" will emerge among world religions 
and one single religion will come out as the victor.24 From this train of thoughts, 
Pannenberg deduces that this kind of concept of God cannot be merely a human 
production, because: 
Belief in one God, of course, implies not merely that he is the power that 
initiates and fulfils our existence but also that we must think of him as the 
Origin and Creator of the world. As we perceive that not only the 
existence of believers and our human nature are defined by God but that 
he is also the power which defines and governs the whole world, we break 
through the barrier of religious anthropocentricity?^ 
This idea of God is exactly the same as that of the "all-determining reality" developed 
in his early period. Finally Pannenberg once again invokes it to test against whether 
one's concept of God is purely a subjective human idea or more than t h a t ^ "In other 
words, the gods of the religions must show in our experience of the world that they 
are the powers which they claim to be. They must confirm themselves by the 
implications of meaning in this experience so that its content can be understood as an 
expression of the power of God but not his weakness.”�？ Pannenberg elaborates this 
idea with 3 notes 
2G Ibid., p. 114. 
21 Steffen Losel, p.504. 
22 STl ,p . l49 . 
23 Ibid.，p. 148. 
24 Ibid., pp. 148-149. 
25 Ibid., p. 158. 




(1) Religious assertions must first be affirmed by the adherents of the 
relevant religious fellowship, otherwise there will not be an immediate 
forsaking of the deity. Sometimes there would be tension between faith 
and experience, this is perhaps the most important cause of change in 
beliefs in the course of integrating experience of the world into faith in 
the deity and its operations. 
(2) The question of confirmation or not of belief in a deity often stands 
under the competitive pressure of the truth claims of other deities. It 
occurs especially where different cultures meet, mingle, or clash, but 
also as an expression of friction within one and the same culture. 
(3) A change in the understanding of the nature and working of the deity 
may result in the course of history. In the process an awareness would 
develop that each experience of new acts of God not only sets all that 
precedes in a new light but also itself proves to be provisional. 
Therefore a definitive self-demonstration of God can only be expected 
at the end-time. 
The purpose of setting up this model of history of religions is quite obvious: 
divine revelation and thus religious truth is only possible by God's self-revelation. 
But man speaks of God only through religion and there are different religions in our 
world. Hence religions must compete with each other until the eschaton to 
demonstrate its finality. In this process, religious truth is continuously put to test. 
Hence theological statement is hypothesis which is testable. Therefore this proposal 
satisfies both the scientific requirement of testability, and at the same time conforms 
to the basic idea of divine revelation as history and is mediated through historic 
religions. Now as a Christian theologian, the thing left for Pannenberg to do is to put 
Christianity under this test.^^ 
The Revelation of God as Witnessed by Christianity 
From the very beginning of his enterprise, Pannenberg is well aware that there 
is a common Barthian (mis)understanding of revelation as the direct self 
29 Ibid.，p. 196. 
57 
manifestation of God as its sole subject.^^ According to the above model of history of 
religions, this idea is untenable since then the truth of dogmatics is already 
presupposed but not regarded as its goal. Hence Pannenberg is obliged to present a 
view of revelation which can satisfy the standard established. 
Against the Barthian perception, as he has done in Offenbarung als Geschichte, 
Pannenberg tries to persuade his readers that there are multiplicity of biblical ideas of 
revelation, in which God may not be the direct content) i Moreover, "closely related 
to this indirectness is the fact that there is knowledge of God only in retrospect of his 
past action in history". After surveying different passages of the Old Testament, 
Pannenberg comes to conclude that before the exilic period "we do not have here self-
revelation in the sense of a communication that is designed to disclose the self, and 
certainly not in the sense of a definitive self-disclosure."^^ It is until the second Isaiah 
that a turning point was formed "by extending the decisive revelation into the 
futiire，，.34 Later in Jewish apocalyptic literatures "there developed the eschatological 
expectation of a final actualizing of the kingdom of God at the end of the series of 
earthly kingdoms. Linked to this was the expectation of God's righteousness for 
individuals beyond this earthly life with the resurrection of the just and judgment for 
sinners，，.35 This observation does not only make nuance to the Barthian conception, 
but also conforms to what Pannenberg requires for a science: a progressive self-
disclosure of God through his historic acts and waiting for an ultimate verdict at the 
eschatological future. 
Besides, Pannenberg thinks that this apocalyptic understanding of revelation 
serves also as the frame of reference for New Testament authors to interpret the 
revelation in Jesus Christ. Thus this specific revelatory event may acquire a unique 
position in history: 
Yet in the coming and work of Jesus we do not have merely a preliminary 
disclosure of the future. The central factor in Jewish expectation, the 
con-ling of God's kingdom, is already here a power that shapes the future. 
Precise at this point: The future of God is not merely disclosed in advance 
with the coming of Jesus; it is already an event, although without ceasing 
-�o For details, see Chapter 1 & 2. 
” S e e esp. STl . pp.198-214. 
Ibid., P.244. 
':�Ibid.，p.207. 
' ' Ib id . , p.213. 
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to be future. The future of God has already dawned. In its own way the 
Christian Easter message corresponds to this structure of the proclamation 
of Jesus, for it declares that the saving future of the resurrection life of 
Jesus has come already, and that in him it has broken in for u s ^ 
Despite the emphasis of a final eschatological future yet to see, Pannenberg wants to 
maintain the conviction that God reveals himself definitively in Jesus of Nazareth. 
His logic is quite simiple: 
Later prophecy argued that only in the events of future eschatological 
salvation would the deity of God be manifest to all flesh. If these final 
events are proleptically present in the person and work of Jesus Christ, 
then eschatological visibility may be ascribed to the Christ event.^^ 
Since Jesus' message proclaims the inbreaking of the eschatological kingdom of God 
insofar as the resurrection from the dead has come true already for him before the end 
3 8 
of history. Therefore it can be said that God is proleptically revealed fully in the 
person Jesus of Nazareth. 
We may see that the main line of thoughts presented here is basically identical 
to that in Offenbarung als Geschichte. However the main difference between them is 
the background to which they are presented. As we have seen in Chapter 1 and 2, the 
dogmatic theses presented in Offenbarung als Geschichte is directed to Karl Barth, 
Heilsgeschichte school, and in fact anyone who do not take “history，，serious enough. 
But in this volume Pannenberg has to face an additional task, namely the truth of 
Christian doctrine as a theme of systematic theology. After these years when he has 
dialogue with the philosophy of science, Pannenberg becomes aware that truth is not a 
status to be grasped completely at present but until eschaton, and more important is to 
demonstrate that theology as a science can be formulated in hypothetical statements, 
which are verifiable but at present can sustain in the worldly reality we experience. 
Therefore we can find in this volume the following words: 
As the revelation of God in his historical action moves towards the still 
outstanding future of the consummation of history, its claim to reveal the 
one God who is the world's Creator, Reconciler, and Redeemer is open to 
future verification in history, which is as yet incomplete, and which is still 
35 Ibid., p.207. 
36 Ibid., p.247. 
37 Ibid., p.249. 
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exposed, therefore, to the question of truth. This question is given an 
ongoing answer in the life of believers by the power of revelation to shed 
light on their life experiences. In theological thinking, then, the question 
finds a provisional answer in the assurance that our own reality and that of 
39 
our world are to be seen as determined by the God of revelation. 
In this way Steffen Losel has made very good comments: “Christians, therefore, 
cannot simply claim that the eternal and infinite God has revealed God's self to the 
world unsurpassably in Jesus. Rather, they must demonstrate their faith to others with 
arguments and, together with the rest of the world, await the end of universal history, 
at which point God's self-revelation will finally be revealed for all to see.，，*。 
An Appraisal 
The Systematic Theology of a theologian is usually rated as his mature product, 
this volume is certainly the magnum opus of Wolfhart Pannenberg. As Stanley Grenz 
has said, before this volume is in print, though the German theologian have dealt with 
various themes of systematics, still they appear fragmentarily. Even we may find that 
Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie has provided the framework of this new 
publication, it can only be treated as some sort of prolegomena. In his first volume of 
Systematische Theologie Pannenberg has arranged his former discussions to 
substantiate a neat framework. Knowing that we are now living in a religiously 
pluralistic world, Pannenberg, instead of being an escapist, has the courage to 
encounter the question of truth directly and even makes it as a theme of his theology. 
This truth is not something hanging in the air, but is experienced through the historic 
religions. Skillfully, based on the foundation of his former works, he built up a view 
of history of religions as a testing system. Finally he tried to show that Christian 
doctrine is though a human construct, can sustain as hypothesis under the scientific 
requirement and even claim to be a provisional account of the divine revelation. By 
this volume Pannenberg has proved himself to be a great systematic theologian of his 
generation. 
38 Cf. Steffen Losel, pp.508-509. 
39 STl,p.257. 
40 Steffen Losel, p.509. 
60 
However, as we have seen from the very beginning of this chapter, critiques to 
this program are not few. Do their accuses really sound? Has Pannenberg really 
created his theology with “some significant paradigms assumed" or intended to make 
a “contextless theology"? In fact, after receiving various kinds of comment, 
Pannenberg knows clearly that “one of the most hotly debated theses oi Revelation as 
History was undoubtedly the statement that in the light of historical effects the 
revelation of God 'is open to anyone who has eyes to see' and does not need any 
supplementary inspired interpretation".'^^ The way of defense he used in Offenbarung 
als Geschichte is by "reflection on the totality of history in the light of the end which 
has already become an event in Jesus Christ，，. 42 That means it involves an 
interpretation of the totality of history through an anticipation of the future. So 
Pannenberg admits openly in this volume that: 
Naturally, the eschatological revelation of God is present in Christ's person 
and work only proleptically, and with the Not Yet of the Christian life this 
implies a brokenness of the knowledge of revelation in the context of 
ongoing debatability and of the power of doubt that constantly assails 
believers .43 
That is to say, even though truth is a theme of his systematic, it can only be obtained 
fully at the eschaton. So we can at most say that Pannenberg really anticipates a unity 
of history of religions at the eschaton, hence a theology with a unique context. But 
Pannenberg knows very well that it can only be achieved in the consummation of 
history, because history as the revelation of God is still accumulating and only at the 
end of time truth-claim can be unsurpassable. What we have present at hand is only 
the hypothesis of that anticipated theology, nevertheless it is founded on the fate of 
Jesus Christ who proleptically reveals the all-determining God. However, we have 
repeatedly mentioned in this essay, and Pannenberg himself has admitted that, the 
revelation through Jesus Christ can only be appropriated from the framework of 
Jewish apocalypticism. Looking in this way, what Pannenberg has created is not a 
contextless theology, but on the contrary a theology with a fixed context! With 
empathy, we may find that those who accuse Pannenberg of making a “contextless” 
41 STl,p.249. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., p.250. 
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theology do not really take it literally, what they are actually not comfortable with is 
the very context Pannenberg presupposed. Pannenberg's theological program is built 
upon a definite context which assumes a certain kind of historical view, namely a 
unity of history is to be found at the consummation, and then a monotheistic 
understanding of reality. Doubtlessly, in this religiously pluralistic world, not 
everyone likes the above presuppositions. Nevertheless, if anyone accepts them, then 
he will find Pannenberg's program very attractive, since it provides a complex whole 
which comprises different aspects of the Christian doctrine and can pass through the 
scientific requirement of testability. However once you decided to take it, you must 
take it entirely; you can hardly embrace only part of it, you must take it all with the 
presuppositions or leave it. That is why Placher sighs: 
One may envy that world or hate it, feel nostalgia for it, dream of restoring 
it or dismiss it as good riddance. But many of us trying to write theology 
in this country find it to be a world in which we do not live.44 
But if Pannenberg just anticipates for such a world but not claims to have established 
it now, then surely no one can dispute that he has offered one of the possibilities. 
Without doubt, others can also construct their own, but Pannenberg's theological 
program demonstrates the ability of Christian dogmatics to satisfy certain 
foundational principles outside the perspective of faith, which must be rated as an 
achievement. 
However, even if the premise of Pannenberg's theology are welcomed, still we 
can enumerate some points in his program arguable. Firstly, after Pannenberg has set 
up his criteria for evaluating a certain historic religion, he has only put Christianity 
under the test. We may have questioned that even though Christianity can pass 
through the test, it does not rule out the possibility of other religions getting through 
the same test. In fact Pannenberg himself is aware of that,45 but after all his concern is 
only for Christianity. Perhaps we should not blame him on this point, because he is 
writing a systematic theology for the unfolding of Christian dogmatics! Secondly, as 
we have said in Chapter 4, though an eschatological self-revelation of God is expected 
at the end of history, does it necessarily entail that only one religion will remain at that 
time? If there is the possibility of multiple religions getting through the test, then why 
44 William C. Placher, p.195. 
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it is not allowed for a plurality of religions remaining as different or even 
complementary accounts for the all-determining reality to the end of time? Because 
of the assumption of the triumph of one religion, it may lead to a very bad attitude for 
doing interreligious dialogue - the aim of dialogue is just to provide a battlefield for 
different religions to compete with one and other; to leam from others their strength 
and assimilate them; and eventually to overthrow the others! This is obviously a kind 
of "intellectual imperialism" but not “mutual enrichment", 46 to enhance a victor at the 
expense of other religions. Thirdly, if different religions have points to be assimilated, 
then it should be admitted that they contain also provisional revelation of God, though 
may be in a lesser degree. But in this way even if the assumption of a single religion 
remains can be accepted, a strange point occurs here. If the history of religions is the 
battlefield of deities and if the historic religions are admitted as provisional 
revelations, then the syncretistic process would appear as one provisional revelation 
fighting against another. Losel makes this clearly: “it seems as if Pannenberg's model 
of the history of the religions curiously assumes that God reveals God's self to the 
world through an ongoing historical conflict against God's very self, even if this 
conflict is caused by finite human (mis)conceptions of the infinite divine m y s t e r y ” 
I think Pannenberg should elaborate this syncretistic moment more profoundly to 
show its rationale. Lastly, Pannenberg seems to think that the final success of a 
religion is due to its explanatory power. But in reality, if we really take "history" 
seriously, we shall find that the success of a religion is usually not only attributed to 
its explanatory power. Perhaps more often the decisive factors include the exercise of 
political, socioeconomic and evil military p o w e r . I t seems that though Pannenberg 
encourages the study of historic religions within the discipline of theology, it is he 
himself because of a lack of a genuine encounter with other religions, thus anticipates 
the history of religions depending on a limited set of past religious history.Has 
Pannenberg concentrated too much on the quest of truth such that he rates the 
importance of explanatory power too high? 
45 STl ,p . l97 . 
46 Cf. John B. Cobb Jr., "Review of Theology and the Philosophy of Science”, pp.213-215; Beyond 
Dialogue (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982). 
Steffen Losel, p.516. 
48 Ibid.,p.517. 
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Last of all, we have left a very important question yet touched: after setting up 
such a grand program, what conclusion Pannenberg has obtained? Although all 
theological statements are hypothetical and even his presuppositions can be refuted 
with his program as a whole, once if you take it, then you will at least get one point 
secured. At the heart of Pannenberg's proposal, the crucial question is in what way is 
the all-determining God proleptically revealed in the fate of Jesus Christ? In fact, as 
early in Offenbarung als Geschichte, Pannenberg has already spelt out unambiguously: 
In the fate of Jesus, God of Israel is revealed as the triune God. The event 
of revelation should not be separated from the being of God himself. The 
being of God does not belong just to the Father, but also to the Son. The 
Holy Spirit also shares in the being of God by virtue of his participation in 
the glory of God that comes to life in the eschatological congregation... All 
of this is connected with the fact that the doctrine of the Trinity formulates 
the concept of God as a historically experienced revelation.49 
Reformulated in this volume of Systematische Theologie, we can find very similar 
assertion at the end of the often regarded "prolegomena" part, saying: 
. . . the theological testing and verification of the truth claims of Christian 
revelation will take place in the form of a systematic reconstruction of 
Christian doctrine, beginning with the understanding of God which is 
contained in the event of his revelation to which the scriptures bear 
witness and which was the express theme in the theological discussions 
that led to the formation of the doctrine of the Trinity.^^ 
After al l it is not any other specific points of his theology Pannenberg wants to 
uphold in this proposal, but the doctrine of Trinity! What he wants to persuade to his 
readers is the triune God whom Christians worship is the all-determining reality in the 
universal history. This is the unsurpassable truth Christianity obtained through the 
proleptic revelation in the fate of Jesus Christ. Therefore there is no surprise that after 
this model of history of religions is presented, Pannenberg begins to elaborate "The 
Trinitarian God" in the next chapter of his book.^^ Christoph Schwobel thinks that 
"Pannenberg's conception of the doctrine of the Trinity is perhaps the most interesting 
aspect of his dogmatic synthesis, since he introduces Trinitarian reflection as a new 
49 RaH, p. 143. 
50 STl,p.257. 
51 See ibid., Chapter 5. 
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approach to the solution of some of the crucial problems of the traditional conception 
of the doctrine of God." As a result, Trinity becomes the interpretative key to his 
unfolding of Christian dogmatics but not vice versa. The implication can be that: 
from a Christian perspective, no matter how the syncretistic movement will look like 
in the future, even if the ultimate religion is no longer known as Christianity, it is still 
the same triune God manifested in the historical Jesus who determines the reality. 
•j 
a i 
' 'Christoph Schwobel, "Wolfhart Pannenberg", David F. Ford ed., The Modern Theolomans (Oxford. 





We have in the preceding chapters examined the development of Pannenberg's 
theological enterprise with special concern to his view of a history of religions. It is 
clear that the systematic theologian in his early years did not quite take the problem of 
religious pluralism in his consideration. The dogmatic theses Pannenberg then set 
concern at most the problem of the history of (Judeo-Christian) religion. It emerges 
from a heart to cure the subjectivist trend of the then contemporary theology. 
Therefore we can easily find Pannenberg the zeal to demonstrate the "historicity" of 
the Christ event, especially the resurrection. However from the very beginning 
Pannenberg is aware that "history is not composed of raw or so-called brute facts... 
history is also the history of the transmission of history.,，】 He knows very well that 
the significance of the Christ event is illuminated from the Jewish prophetic-
apocalypticism, therefore he has to explain why the revelation in Jesus Christ is 
meaningful to people other than Jewish race. This is the reason Pannenberg began to 
deal with the issue of the encounter of different religions. 
Following his intention to invoke a historical turn in contemporary theology, 
Pannenberg has proposed a theology of the history of religions. "Religions" he means 
not some abstract forms of "religion-in-general" but historic religions. As Cobb 
commented, this fully historical approach should be recognized as a contribution since 
it shows that religions are all in the process of change throughout history.^ Though it 
is not the only approach to deal with the encounter of different religions, theologian 
who wants to deal genuinely with the issue can hardly ignore the past history of 
encounter. Making investigation from one's own dogmatic position is important, but 
if it is the only way of doing then it may easily become too abstract and 
"supematuralistic"^ without doing justice to concrete situation. 
1 RaH, P.152. 
- J o h n B . Cobb, Beyond Dialogue (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982) p 40 
Cf. TTHoR，P.71; also pp.68-69. 
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The special point of Pannenberg's proposal does not end with his historical 
interest, but making the history of religions as a testing system. This treatment does 
not only clarify the nature of dogmatic statements as hypothesis and doxology and 
justifies the investigation of historic religions in theology, but also demonstrates the 
testability and thus the scientific status of theology. However the controversial point 
also emerges from the setting up of this system. As early in "Hermeneutic and 
Universal History”，Pannenberg is aware that the universal history is a projection of 
human being, though it is a must for the perception of the meaning of events in history. 
It seems that although Pannenberg wants to abolish the boundary between salvation 
history and secular history and not to diffuse the redemptive event into human 
historicity, the universal history he proposes exists only in human speculation.* From 
this process we may learn that if what we want is not merely brute facts, then certain 
kind of historical approach must be employed, hence no so-called objective history is 
possible. But in Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie Pannenberg attempted to treat 
the experienced reality as the neutral data for establishing an unprejudiced paradigm. 
After the dialogue with the philosophy of science, he is wise enough to tell that truth 
is not a status to be obtained completely now but is anticipated at the eschaton. But 
one step is still needed to complete the discourse: the conception of a universal history 
with a monotheistic and eschatological view as its basis. However this basis is the 
most crucial hypothesis to be tested while it has got only verifiability but not 
falsifiability. Perhaps there is nothing to blame Pannenberg of creating a theology of 
history of religions from his own specific perspective, as it cannot be avoided. 
Although not everyone would like his way of doing theology, no one can deny that 
Pannenberg has built up a coherent system demonstrating a certain degree of 
testability. This is the very point Pannenberg's theology can claim of a non-fideistic 
revelationist position and it should be rendered as an achievement in modem 
theological investigation. 
In fact, maybe what we find most uncomfortable with Pannenberg is the 
generalization of his western perspective to a universal framework. In his works we 
find that he is mainly speaking from a western Christian perspective for a history of 
religions. However, though little is the effort Pannenberg has paid to the study of 
other historic religions, he is not totally ignorant about their development. 
‘Cf. HaUH, pp.134-136. 
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Pannenberg has tried hard to present us a scenario that when different religions 
encounter, a syncretistic moment is likely to occur,^ so to persuade us to accept a unity 
of history of religions. But it is easy to discover that his argument draws mainly from 
that of the Middle East and Europe, hence Cobb's comment is suggestive: 
In approaching Eastern modes of religion by generalization from Western 
religious experience Pannenberg follows the dominant tradition of 
Western thinkers. Paul Tillich is a recent example. But this tradition 
should be broken. If we are to have a theology of religion, we must listen 
to the thinkers of other traditions, not only to hear how they answer 
questions that we pose out of our experience, but also to learn how they 
pose the questions.^ 
Pannenberg should have known very well this opinion, otherwise it is not reasonable 
for him to explain to us Gentiles "the universality of the eschatological self-
vindication of God in the fate of Jesus" as early in Offenbarung als Geschichte 
(Thesis 6),^ in addition to argue for a religious a priori anthropology possessing an 
open attitude to the world.^ Are these Pannenberg's attempts to show the explanatory 
power of Christianity? If it is his intention to do so, then it is really a bad news for 
him to hear about the disappointment from people living in other contexts, especially 
they are Christian theologians. It is because this is just a sign of weakness his 
theology has shown, to the point that even intersubjective level of validity within his 
own religious community is not gained! 
It is paradoxical that one of the contributions Pannenberg has made in his 
proposal is the emphasis of the study of historic religions in theological investigation, 
eventually he himself depends only on a limited set of historical data and anticipates 
his view of history of religions. However we may have already known quite well that 
the reality is far more complex than we have dreamed from our own religio-cultural 
perspective, but the question is from our limited mind-set, we are always bounded 
within a certain point of view, then how can we complicate our theology? Though 
Cobb has equated Tillich to Pannenberg as the same type of Western thinker, I find 
that there exists at least one difference between them. While Pannenberg anticipates 
' C f . TTHoR, p.74; STl, p.l50. 
John B. Cobb, "Review on Theology and the Philosophy of Science” p 214 
'RaH, pp. 149-152. 
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for a unity of history of religions through a syncretistic process, Tillich's purpose to 
engage in inter-religious encounter is “not conversion, but dialogue”.9 Tillich's vision 
for a Christian universalism is not a syncretistic o n e , � he does not think that a fusion 
should be aimed for the inter-religious encounter.^ Tillich is aware that as a western 
theologian he is only speaking from his own foundation and for his own foundation. ^ ^ 
The difference I found between Pannenberg and Tillich is this awareness.丨�However 
Tillich does not totally deny the possibility of a fusion of religion, but he says, “a 
living religion comes to life only if a new revelatory experience appears". ^^  The 
implication of this statement may be that, this kind of new revelatory experience 
cannot only be embraced by any one religion, but both or even multiple sides 
participating in this fusion. But still we can ask: then why different religious 
communities would have the intention to form a fusion? The answer cannot be 
granted from explanatory power formulated by Pannenberg's favourite idealistic 
philosophy, because it is an existential problem. As a Christian and as a Chinese I 
often long for such a fusion. Prof. Philip Shen years ago have also expressed: 
I am, for example, a Christian and a Chinese who lives and works in a 
mixed and fast-changing environment I do not wish to be alienated from 
my Christian faith because of my cultural heritage, or from my cultural 
birthright because of my religious belief. I therefore live with the tension 
between being Christian and being Chinese. The tension may be so great 
that I cannot hold both together without breaking myself. Or the tension 
may be so creative that it leads to a new and enriched sense of personal 
identity and integrity. This is, if you will, a "mode of being in the world" 
for me which I must risk and explore in my own "journey of 
intensification", in my self-understanding and self-affirmation. My 
8 / r 版代 Pa^enberg, What is Man? Duane A. Priebe trans. (Philadelphia. Fortress 1970V 
p J l 了 ' � � � , "偏 0 — 1 — e c u观,M a t t h e w J. O'Connell trans. 
C如.她 _ —the Encounter of World Religions (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994), p.34. 
1 丨 Ibid.:p.42: 
12 Ibid., p.79. 
to CMst . Religious Pluralism” (in C h i n e s e : �宗教多元中對聽 
14 Paul Tillich, P.42. 
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theological reflection should be able to help me in this personal project or it 
is not worth m u c h ” 
Chinese Christians have long been living under a tension described by Shen, but I 
think that a simple mix up is neither what we want nor Pannenberg's real intention. 
After elaborating Pannenberg's model of a theology of the history of religions, what 
can we learn from him? 
Firstly, if we do not aim at an arbitrary mix up, then we should ask ourselves 
what is the element we cannot lessen from the Christian perspective? To Pannenberg, 
the answer is very clear: the self-revelation of God as proleptically manifested in the 
fate of Jesus Christ. If we are contended with this interpretation, then the fused 
theology must still leam carefully from the doctrine of Trinity as revealed from the 
Christ event. Secondly, as we have mentioned previously, Pannenberg has affirmed 
that non-Christian religions can also bear the divine revelation. In reality, as a 
consequence, we must ask: in what way does a particular religion demonstrate its 
strength such that Christianity should try to assimilate? We cannot get the answer 
except from a genuine study of the religion from its context. This is exactly the 
reason Pannenberg encourages the scientific study of historic religions. Then the 
most difficult point emerges, if the points extracted from the above two steps 
originated from different religious paradigms, then some of their elements may not be 
compatible. If this is the case, then how can they be fused? Unfortunately 
Pannenberg has not offered any concrete suggestion, instead to him which one 
religious paradigm can best explain the reality experienced at the moment, then others 
will be ousted. This may be another thing we find most disappointed from 
Pannenberg's system, i.e. a lack of proposing some concrete and critical criteria for 
undergoing the syncretism. It is also the reason Cobb finds him an intellectual 
imperialism 一 once different religious views encounter, they must fight against each 
other until a victor survives and the opponent dies down. Lastly, if our above 
comments are correct, and if the triumph of one religion is not guaranteed, then we 
must admit that even though we have assimilated every good point from other 
religions at one moment and overcome the conflict between different religions, there 
is still possibility for the assimilated religion to develop after this fusion in the course 
of history, according to the freedom of the Spirit. For example, the emergence of 
Philip Shen, "Theological Pluralism: An Asian Response to David Tracy", Journal of the American 
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Christianity in history does not necessarily lead to a conclusion that Judaism can 
undergo no advancement afterwards. That means there can be infinite points for us to 
learn even from one single religion in God's history until the end of time. We are at 
all times only working for our own religious community from our own perspective. A 
theology of the history of religions may get its speculative elements as the history is 
still on its way of forming, a genuine study of and encounter with the historic 
religions is essential for renewal and transformation always. Therefore it is still very 
important for us to learn from Pannenberg that our formulation of theological 
statement can at most be hypothesis, which can always be surpassed. 
Academy of Religion 53 (1985), p.743. 
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